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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Need for Computer Aided Modeling
The subject of fault-tolerant computing deals with the reliability and availability of
computer hardware, software, and systems. Because of the rapid advances in the computer
field, there has been an enormous amount of work done in this area in the last two decades.
Many of the most challenging reliability problems of our present decade involve complex
distributed systems such as interconnected telephone switching computers, air traffic control
centers, aircraft and space vehicles, and local area and wide area computer networks. In
addition to the challenge of complexity, modern fault tolerant computer systems require very
high levels of reliability and availability. For example, NASA's SATURN V launch computer
(circa 1964) had a reliability requirement equivalent to a mean time to failure, MTTF, of 25,000
hours. In the late 1970's the SIFT and FTMP avionic computers designed to control
dynamically unstable aircraft had a MTTF goal of one billion hours (Pradhan 1986, p. xiii, 421.)
We can contrast this with the observed mean time to system crash MTTC for several commercial
computers (Pradhan 1986, p. 420): Burrows B5500 14.7h, Univac 1108 17h, Dual 370/165 system
8.9h, PDP-10 10h, CRAY-! 4h. Clearly no ordinary design can meet such goals. The
aerospace computers discussed above employ several hardware and software reliability
enhancement techniques to achieve acceptable levels of system reliability and availability. The
ready availability of low cost microprocessors and electronic memory has encouraged the use of
multiple processors to achieve high reliability and often leads to distributed computing systems.
The fault-tolerant systems described above are very complex due to the large number of
processors, various versions of the software, complex schemes for redundancy management, and
error recovery. Also, there are many competing approaches to fault tolerance. One of the most
important design criteria is the system reliability (and availability), thus the reliability analyst or
system designer is faced with the task of building and solving a complex reliability model or a
group of complex models if a design trade-off study is underway. Another characteristic of
fault-tolerant systems is that they must respond rapidly when a redundant unit fails and switch
in a good spare unit or combine the output with correct outputs from redundant units. The net
result is that one has a mixture of fast response to failures and slower "natural response" of the
system. This leads to a mixture of time constants and results in so-called "stiff" differential
equations which are hard to solve. Most analysts find that it is too difficult to model and solve
such complex systems without computer aided design programs. This has led to the suite of
computer aided reliability modeling programs developed by NASA, and specifically the HARP
program, which is the subject of this proposal.
1.2 Target Machines and Languages
In devising a computer aided design program, some thought should be given to which
computer systems and languages the prospective users will find most convenient. If we consider
the primary users to be the modest sized group of large aerospace manufactures, then in all
likelihood the company possesses an ample assortment of large mainframes, supermini
computers, workstations, and personal computers. Thus, if the programs are to be used only
occasionally, a standard host computer can be supported as long as the program is written in one
of the modern languages such as C, Ada, Pascal, Fortran 77, etc. However, if the modeler is to
use the program frequently, then it is important that he have ready access to the host computer
in his own work area, which generally favors a PC or work station. Many of the older
reliability analysis programs including HARP, evolved over a period of time and the language in
which they are written was fixed a long ago without regard to their evolution. In the case of
HARP, FORTRAN was the chosen language and one would have expected that the program
design concepts and syntax would be compatible with a modern version of Fortran 77, however
this was not the case, and many sections were written in older versions of Fortran.
1.3 Uses for a Modeling Program
A reliability modeling program can serve many uses:
1. It allows one to predict the reliability and availability of a complex system during the
proposal/early design stages, and evaluate if proposed design improvements will help
meet reliability requirements.
2. It allows an analyst to do a comparative study among various proposed design alternatives
so that the final decision will weigh realistic quantitative reliability estimates.
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3. If the program becomes widely used, then its nomenclature and approach become a
standard in the reliability analysis area, and provide a uniform basis of comparison in
contracting, the technical literature, and education.
4. The standardization referred to in 3 above could serve as a standard for reliability data
gathering, during development and field deployment.
1.4 The Need for Institutional Support
Most large computer programs which achieve success are used over a much longer period
of time then their designers initially envisioned. This often leads to problems with regard to
maintenance and enhancement. There is always a need to correct errors discovered during the
lifetime of a program and port the code to various other computers and correct minor
inconsistencies, correct maintain, and extend manuals, etc. In addition, as new computer systems
and facilities become available, there is a need to modify and enhance programs. Lastly, as the
field of fault-tolerant, distributed systems evolves, there will probably be a need for additional
modeling capability which is not present in contemporary programs. For example, it is not clear
whether presently available computer programs can easily model all the different techniques of
software fault tolerance which have been proposed.
The long term support of the various fault-tolerant modeling programs developed by
NASA is a mater of some concern. Such support and maintenance can require a substantial
amount of annual funding without which such programs disappear. Such was the fate of the
first availability modeling program (known to the author) GEM, developed by the NAVY in the
late 1960's [Orbach 1970]. Consider electronic circuit analysis programs as one example of how
such long term support develops. In the 1960, the first widely used electronic circuit analysis
program, ECAP, was developed by IBM [Jensen 1968]. Initially IBM provided versions of this
program which ran on their 1620, 7094, and 360 computers. In the mid 1970's, the SPICE
program was developed with public funds at the University of California Berkeley by Prof.
D.O. Pederson and his colleagues and students, [Antognetti 1988]. Supermini, fileserver, and PC
versions of this program are now available from commercial sources which provide the
necessary support. However, before the reader draws to hasty a parallel, we should add that the
base of electronic circuit modelers is much larger than that of reliability analysts. For example
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the membership of the IEEE is now 315,000 members, 32 technical societies, and the Reliability
Society has about 4,300 members whereas there are 29,300 members who belong to the
Electronic Devices, the Circuits and Systems Society, or the Components and Manufacturing
Society. The 7:1 difference in members between these two groupings may not accurately reflect
the relative number of users of fault-tolerant programs and circuit analysis programs; however,
a strategy which works for electronics may not work for reliability. Thus, one must consider
various governmental, professional, university, and commercial strategies (individually or
cooperatively) for support of fault-tolerant programs over their extended lifetimes.
One must also realize that a suite of reliability modeling programs which have been
developed for use within the aerospace community have a much wider range of applicability.
Such programs could, for example, be used to analyze a fault-tolerant air traffic control system,
a redundant communications network, or any complex digital system with many operating states.
This is important to keep in mind with regard to NASA's goals for technology transfer. Also if
these programs are to be maintained over a long period of time it may be necessary to explore a
larger user base to help pay for continued maintenance of such a suite of programs.
1.5 Viewpoint of This Research Study
It should be apparent to the reader that this introduction discusses many factors and much
more breath then were investigated under the modest budget which submitted for this grant.
This is done for a number of reasons. First, the author hopes that such discussions will be
helpful to NASA in planning and coordinating their future research in this area. Second, this
will help further define the viewpoint for the study.
It seemed clear at many points during this study that there was not a clear set of detailed
instructions on how to use HARP. In addition there is a need for a clear plan as to how the
newer fault-tolerant programs will supplant or complement the existing programs.
Unfortunately, this is the rule and not the exception with most projects, thus we must
constantly work hard to eliminate this problem. Furthermore, because of the mathematical
nature of the problems to be solved, there must be strong and constant coordination between the
math modelers and the software developers, which at times seemed lacking.
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2.0 EFFECTIVENESS OF SYSTEM DESIGN TOOLS
The best overall measure of goodness for a system design tool is how frequently the user
employs the tool, and how much it helps him in his analysis and design tasks. This overall
measure can be expressed in terms of a number of components which are discussed below.
2.1 Ease of Use
The three key goals in any computer aided design program are ease of use, correctness of
the result, and generality of the problem set which can be modeled. Ease of use depends on:
(a) how well the program is described (documentation)
(b) how easy it is to input the structure of the problem
(c) how easy it is to choose the various modeling modes
In addition a superior program generally provides graphic output showing the system
model as well as tabular and graphic output.
2.2 Quality of documentation
An important aspect of the documentation is the insight provided into the model
limitations. Most computer models will have limitations, i.e. situations in which the answers are
wrong due to round-off errors, modeling anomalies, errors in the algorithm, etc. In some cases,
it may be easier to describe the type of problems and situations in which such problems occur.
And clear statement of such problems improves the documentation.
2.3 Correctness of result
The primary measure of the correctness of the result is how well the algorithms upon
which the program is based compute the correct result, i.e.. the program accuracy.
Computational algorithms are not always correct for all modes or all conditions. Even if we
assume that the computational algorithm is correct, one can still obtain wrong results if the
round-off errors in computation cause significant inaccuracies.
Another measure of the correctness of the result is how well we can verify the program
(the implementation of the algorithm). A computer aided design program must be treated like
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any other program, i.e. it will contain errors once developed and must be verified. One
program will have an advantage over others if it is easier to verify.
Of course we should not overlook the correctness of the basic model which we use as our
program input. A wrong model can lead to wrong results even if our program is flawless. This
is discussed in more detail in Appendix D. Also, one must realize that the data used to compute
failure and repair rates is often noisy on a small sample. Thus, the various Markov model
parameters should really be stated as point and interval values. If the range of the interval
estimate is broad, then the accuracy of the modeling results may be more heavily dependent on
model parameter values than program fidelity.
2.4 Modeling Time Required, Computational Speed, Memory Requirements
All computer modeling techniques are resource limited and the amount of analysts time
required to set up the problem and interpret the results is one basis of comparison. In addition,
one must be concerned with the amount of computer time and memory used in computation and
the amount of disk space needed to store the program, the model, and the results of runs which
must be retained for study.
2.5 Generality of Program
A reliability program generally has many different behaviors which must be modeled.
The following is a partial list of factors which should be modeled:
(a) Constant failure rate.
(b) Non-constant failure rate (Weibull, other)
(c) Constant repair rates.
(d) Non-constant repair rates.
(e) Series-parallel structures supported.
(f) Non-series-parallel structures (bridges, etc.) supported.
2.6 Ease of Installation
Most computer programs are developed in a given language using a particular compiler,
and a host computer. A measure of how easy the program is to install can be obtained when we
try to move the program to other compilers and other host computers. Robust programs will
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install with little problem. An example of this is the ease with which a personal computer
program can be installed on an MS DOS compatible computer.
3.0 EXPERIENCES WITH HARP
3.1 Basis of Evaluation
In order to evaluate the ease of installing HARP on a computer
"ground rules" were adopted:
system, the following
Only minor help from system programmer and NASA should be requested.
System to be used by Poly instructor and students in graduate courses in reliability
and fault-tolerant systems.
Comparisons made with other programs limited to those already available at Poly,
namely ARIES.
Thus, the installation was attempted by this author, who has only elementary knowledge of the
Unix operating system with minor help from our Unix expert and some help from a graduate
student with an intermediate knowledge of the Unix.
3.2 Experiences with Installation
A number of difficulties were encountered in attempting to install HARP on the Poly
Gould computer. These could not be easily resolved without significant systems programming
(not covered by this Grant). (See Appendix B.) Thus the tests of HARP were via network
connection to a Langley Airlab computer.
3.3 Comments on Modeling With HARP
In late 1989 and early 1990 two reports were written by five NASA researchers which
thoroughly investigated some of the mathematical and modeling basis of HARP and other fault
tolerant computing programs:
"A Critical Assessment of the HARP Program," Kelly J. Hayhurst, Rickey W.
Butler, and Sally C. Johnson, Draft NASA Technical Memorandum 102607,
NASA Langley, Feb. 1990.
"A Review of the HARP Program: Approach and Mathematics," Allan L. White,
Draft NASA Technical Memorandum, NASA Langley, Nov. 1989.
The comments (reviews) on these two reports contributes to the detailed understanding of
HARP and appears in Appendix C.
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3.4 Experiences with Using HARP
This section is based on the authors own experiences in using HARP and those of his two
graduate classes who used HARP.
During the spring semester of 1990 Prof. Shopman taught two graduate courses at the
Polytechnic Farmingdale Campus which involved probabilistic analysis. The 18 students in
these classes used both the ARIES and HARP programs in the courses. Twelve of the students
completed a questionnaire on their experiences with ARIES and HARP and the details are given
in Appendix A.
The students were predominantly Part Time MSEE students, working in industry, with
some experience in reliability and quite a bit of computer experience. Overall, the students
found both ARIES and HARP useful and the documentation provided to the class was
satisfactory. Scoring the results using a 4 point scale similar to a University grading system
(Excellent -- 4 --A, Good = 3 -- B, Fair -- 2 _- C, Poor = 1 _ D), we obtain overall satisfaction
scores of 2.9 for ARIES and 2.8 for HARP. The scores for documentation were 2.8 for ARIES
and 3.4 for HARP (Tutorial was distributed). In summary, both programs received B - scores,
however due to the detail provided by the HARP Tutorial, the documentation score for HARP
was B +. Details of the responses are given in Appendix A.
Prof. Shopman will be using SHURE and ASSIST in his future courses on fault-tolerant
computing and will provide NASA Langley with feedback on their effectiveness and student
acceptance on an informal basis in the future.
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4.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
HARP has played a transitional role in the development of fault-tolerant computer
programs as has ARIES. Neither of these programs is mature enough in terms of basic
modeling ease, validity, and generality of the algorithms to serve as a standard. Also the
implementation is not user friendly enough in terms of input/output or in terms of a standard
transportable version.
NASA should investigate their newer programs such as SHURE, PAWS, STEM, ASSIST
and FAULT-TREE to see if some subset of these can serve as the standard program. Further it
is suggested that there be three implementations:
(a) For MS-DOS 286, 386, 486 machines.
(b) For Unix systems such as SUN workstations, etc.
(c) For Macintosh computers.
Each of these implementations should be carefully planned to be functionally equivalent, easily
transportable, and user friendly (standard modeling terms and ease of input and output). Proper
documentation at a systems and users level is required. Considerable thought should be given as
to how a standard program can be maintained since such a program is truly a "national resource"
for fault-tolerant (and general reliability) analysts.
-9-
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APPENDIX A
CLASS SURVEY FORM - HARP AND ARIES
A-l
A. 1 INTRODUCTION
During the spring semester of 1990 Prof. Shooman taught two graduate courses at the
Polytechnic Farmingdale Campus which involved probabilistic analysis, CS907 Fault-Tolerant
Computing and EL617/IE685 System Reliability. Descriptions of CS907 and EL617 appear in
Tables A-1 and A-2 respectively. Course CS907 is given by the Computer Science Department
and about half the students who take the course are EE students and half CS students. Course
EL617/IE685 is jointly sponsored by the Electrical Engineering and Industrial Engineering
Departments and the majority of the students are EE's. Since the courses were given in the
evening at the Farmingdale Long Island Campus, most of the students were working in industry
and pursuing an MS degree part time in the evening. (There were a few full time Senior
Undergraduates who were taking these courses for elective credit.) Both the ARIES and HARP
programs were used in the classes and the students agreed to fill out the questionnaire shown in
Table A-3. The ARIES program was installed on the Poly Gould supermini computer and was
accessed from the terminals in the Farmingdale Computer Room or via a modem from work or
home. The HARP program at the Langley Research Airlab computer was accessed via the
TELNET network from terminals in the Farmingdale Computer Room or via a modem from
work or home.
A.2 RESULTS
There were 11 students in CS 907 and 10 in EL617 and two students took both classes.
Out of the 19 students, 12 returned a completed survey form. A summary of the responses to
the various questions appears in Table A-4. As can be seen from Table A-4, the students were
predominantly Part Time MSEE students, working in industry, with some experience in
reliability and quite a bit of computer experience. Overall, the students found both ARIES and
HARP useful and the documentation provided to the class was satisfactory. Scoring the results
using a 4 point scale (similar to University grading) where Worked well (good) is 4, Satisfactory
is a 3, Fair is a 2 and Poor is a 1, we obtain an overall scores of 2.9 for ARIES and 2.8 for
HARP. The scores for documentation were 2.8 for ARIES and 3.4 for HARP.
A-2
TABLE A-I Tolerant Computing
m"
Description of Course CS907 - Fault
COMPUTER SCIENCE DEPARTMENT
BROOKLYN CAMPUS
C._9(}8 - FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTERS
MISSION TO MARS
CONTROL OF NUCLEAR REACTORS
UNSTABLE AIRCRAFT: BOEING 767-400, AIRBUS A_oO
AIR-TRAFFIC CONTROL
NON-STOP BANK FUNDS TRANSFER
RELIABLE AND AVAILABLE LANS
Much of modern society depends on reliable, safe, available and fault-free computing. Digital computers allow a
wide range of redundant approaches to insure continuous operation, i.e, tolerance to individual hardware
component or software faults. This course introduces and studies a variety of hardware and software techniques
for designing and modeling Fault Tolerant computers. Topics will include:
• Coding techniques (Hamming, SECSED, SECDED, etc.) to detect and correct memory and data
transmission errors
• Parallel processors and majority voting schemes (TMR)
• Software redundancy (N-Version programming, dependency models)
• Software checks and recovery schemes
The course will introduce the architectures, approaches, and probabilistic models needed to compare the reliability
and availability of various techniques. Examples will be drawn from space fault-tolerant approaches, LAN network
examples, and commercial non-stop systems such as TANDEM and STRATUS. The HARP and ARIES
Fault-Tolerant modeling tools will be used for system reliability and availability computations for homework and the
term design project.
PREREQUISITES: CS237 and MA 223 or approval of instructor*
INSTRUCTOR: Professor Martin Shooman (Ext. 4290)
TEXTBOOK: The Theory and Practice of Reliable System Design, Siewiorek and Swarz, Digital Press, 1982
plus supplementary notes by M. Shooman.
DAY AND TIME: Wednesday - 5:55 - 8;10 PM (Brooklyn, Spring 1991, ISIS No. 20844)
*Suitable for use as a technical elective for EE and CS Graduate Students or for Seniors with Advisor's approval.
TABLE A-2 Description of Course EL617/IE685 - System Reliability
EL 617 System Reliability* 21/=:0:3
Structural reliability, redundancy, bounds on reliability of complex
systems. Repairable systems: Markov models, maintainability and
availability. Optimization of spare parts inventories, inspection inter.
vals and replacement times. Failure models: accumulated shocks
and stress-strength-time. Marginal failures, dependent failures. Pre-
requisite: EL 531 or MA 561 or equivalent.
Also listed under IE 685
TABLE A-3
USE OF ARIES AND HARP QUESTIONAIRE FOR:
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
EL617 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM FARMINGDALE APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shopman, Farmingdale Room 222 or Ms. JoAnn
McDonald Room 250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and modeling flexibility
of the ARIES and HARP fault-tolerant computing programs. Sometimes you will be asked to comment from
the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a practicing professional.
1. Education:
Degree Year Completed School
(or expected)
Concentration Area
.
Full Time Part Time
Employment:
Full Time Part Time
Company:
EE CS MS Ph.D. Other:
Full Time Student Work Summers
Job Title:
. Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis:
Course work: Very Experienced Experienced
Describe academic experience:
Some Knowledge First Course
Professional Experience:
Very Experienced
Describe work experience:
Experienced Some Knowledge First Course
4. Computer Experience:
Hardware:
Level:
Software:
Level:
Main Frame
Very Experienced
DOS UNIX
Very Experienced
Mini
___Experienced
VMS
__.Experienced
PC/XT/AT Work Station
Some Knowledge
Xwindows Other
Some Knowledge
Special
Beginner
Beginner
5. Experiences with ARIES:
Worked well ...____tisfaetory Fair
6. Experiences with HARP:
Worked well Satisfactory Fair
7. How useful was the Documentation on ARIES:
The Users Manual: Good Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's Notes: Good
8. How useful was the Documentation on HARP:
The tutorial: Good Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's notes: Good
9. Describe any errors or problems you had with aries:
Fair Poor
Satisfactory Fair Poor
Fair Poor
Satisfactory Fair Poor
10. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
11. How could ARIES be improved?
12. How could HARP be improved?
13. Would you be interested in doing a project or thesis for credition evaluating and improving ARIES and
HARP:
Yes Maybe No
14. Optional
Name:
Phone Number:.
15. Additional Comments:
Address:
Use additional sheets if necessary.
TABLE A-4 Photocopies of Students Responses to Questionnaire

°,
USE OF ARIES AND HARP QUESTIONAIRE FOR:
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
ELdI7 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM FARMINGDALE APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shopman, Farmingdale Room 222 or Ms. JoAnn
McDonald Room 250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and modeling flexibility
of the ARIES and HARP fault=tolerant computing programs. Sometimes you will be asked to comment from
the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a practicing professional.
I. Education:
.=_
Degree Year Completed
(or expected)
d
School Concentration Area
Y
Full Time .z__Part Time ._EE ___ CS _=___MS
2. Employment:
Ph.D. Other:.
.
_<'Full Time Part Time Full Time Student
Company: "_'//7/" t" _" C-_ _'(" Z_
Job Title:_____l_
Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis:
Work Summers
Course work: Very Experienced _._Experienced
Describe academic experience: _ 7" ,._,,..__ 1__
Some Knowledge First Course
Professional Experience:
Very Experienced Experienced "_Some Knowledge First Course
Describe work experience:_
Hardware: _____MainFrame __.___.Mini ___PC/XT/AT ___._orkStation
Level: _f_.__Very Experienced Experienced
Software: _..DOS ..__UNIX _2_ff_.VMS
Level: ____..._Very Experienced Experienced
_pecial
Some Knowledge Beginner
Xwindows __Other -_/ __7/
Some Knowledge Beginner

5. Experiences with ARIES:
Worked well "___.__Satisfactory Fair
6. Experiences with HARP:
Worked well __.._Satisfactory Fair
7. How useful was the Documentation on ARIES:
The Users Manual: Good Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's Notes: Good
8. How useful was the Documentation on HARP:
x.
The tutorial: Good "x_._Satisfactory
from Shooman's notes: ___._GoodThe material
9. Describe any errors or problems you had with aries:
_. ..... (/ ./
Poor
"_Fair Poor
Fair Poor
Satisfactory Fair Poor
/
10. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
f - • - _ _
t
/ j
11. How could ARIES be improved?
/ ¢
12. How could HARP be improved?
13. Would you be interested in doing a project or thesis for credition evaluating and improving ARIES and
HARP:
/
Yes Maybe No /'_/_/_

14. Optional
Name: .. ,,_- _'/dr'./'"
Phone Number: _/_//?--2 7/4
Address: ./9" _ /"4 __,_¢_,
/
_,y //_ _-_
15. Additional Comments:
Use additional sheets if necessary.

USE OF ARIES AND HARP QUESTIONAIRE FOR:
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
EL617 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM FARMINGDALE APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shopman, Farmingdale .Room 222 or Ms. JoAnn
McDonald Room 250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and modeling flexibility
of the ARIES and HARP fault-tolerant computing programs. Sometimes you will be asked to comment from
the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a practicing professional.
1. Education:
Degree Year Completed School
(or expected)
Concentration Area
.4..
.
Full Time ¢_,..._Part Time EE CS _" MS Ph.D. Other:.
Employment:
_._Full Time Part Time Student WorkFull Time Summers
Past Experience with reliability or probabilisttc analysis:
Course work: __Very Experienced Experienced
Describe academic experience: g_ _"
_. Some Knowledge L_._First Course
Ij,.,,,.
Professional Experience:
Very Experienced
Describe work experience: 4o E
Some Knowledge First Course
. Computer Experience:
Hardware: Main Frame ____Mini __PC/XT/AT __Work Station
Level: Very Experienced ,__.Experienced Some Knowledge
Software: ./_DOS /_ UNIX )_VMS Xwindows Other
Level: Very Experienced _____Experienced Some Knowledge
Special
Beginner
Beginner

5. Experiences with ARIES:
___Worked well Satisfactory Fair
6. Experiences with HARP:
Worked well Satisfactory Fair
7. How useful was the Documentation on ARIES:
The Users Manual: __Good Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's Notes: _ Good
8. How useful was the Documentation on HARP:
The tutorial: _.___Good Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's notes: _ Good
9. Describe any errors or problems you had with aries:
Fair
Satisfactory
Poor
Fair Poor
Fair Poor
Satisfactory Fair Poor
10. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
I1.
12.
How could ARIES be improved?
|
How could HARP be improved?
13. Would you be interested in doing a project or thesis for credition evaluating and improving ARIES and
HARP:
t_L_Yes Maybe No

14. Optional
Name: _],'/_'_'_/_(/ _/Ot]_-A.A
Phone Number:.('_'/_'2"_ O-/_q O_.
15. Additional Comments:
Address: .:/ -c/f, !(,._,,,/ _ _
Use additional sheets if necessary.

USE OF ARIES AND HARP
QUESTIONAIRE FOR
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
EL617 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM, FARMINGDALE, APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shooman, Farmingdale
RM222 or Ms. Jo Ann McDonald RM250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and
modeling flexibility of the ARIES and HARP fault=tolerant computing programs. Sometimes
you will be asked to comment from the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a
practicingprofessional.
1. Education
Degree Year Completed School
(or expected)
lq Zz Po 4a.hn c
Concentration Area
.
Full Time Part Time EE CS MS Phd. Other
Employment
_/'Full Time Part Time Full Time Student Work Summers
Company: CTrt.,Ol_)¢t,l >m]irzr:t../_ .C:./_l(/_ 3
Job Title: -/-:or 2o _t" E_ ;'1 )__ < (" f -" _-_ //_'J
5
3. Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis.
Course work: Very Experienced Experienced
Some Knowledg-e'- V'First Course
Describe academic experience:
Professional Experience: Very Experienced Experienced
Some Knowledge
First Course
Describe work experience: /1_(7_
,. _.,
. Computer Experience
Hardware: SMain Frame
Level: _V_ery Experienced
'Some Knowledge
Software: __ DOS UNIX
Level: ____ery Experienced
_/._.SOme Knowledge
Mini v_'/PC/XT/AT
Experienced
Beginner
ZVMS Xwindows
Experienced
Beginner
s=ioo .oia,
Other

i. F_periences with ARIE_
Worked well Satisfactory
i E_riences with HARP _- Fair PpOOr
Worked well Satisfactory Fair -- oor
'. How useful was the Documentation on ARIES
The users manual Good IV Satisfactory F_ir __Poor
The material from-ShoomanTss Notes: Good l_Satlsfactory Fair Poor
I. How useful was the Documentation on HARP
The tutorial: --Good u/Satisfactory F__ air Poor
The material from Shooman's notes: --Good _S_isfactoryFair Poor
_. Describe any error_ or problems you had with ARIES:
.0 Describe any errors or problems .vouu ha_ with HARP: :_
/q p. -.--/z_" /2f//1,'lf, )'/f" .T- } :"/r"//1Kff_/,/ /2k,..z./p/ r-,-_/.,.,,-tq.,.v;/ . :v/, /.t% i.-"
1 . HOw could ARIES be. improved? ' ' ; J - " "- " "
D_r f._/z_zzm__n,i
12. How, could HARP be _mproved? /,' ,; ., ,
/=. /..k?'z_ /'z/zz_t_rrow_. "  )d-l-b,,/" .dTz_Cn/._÷ ,6"Y,_W_ _'/4_f,,]_.,_ F /._.¢._/
I
evaluating and improving ARIES and HARP: Yes _/Maybe __No
.4. OPTIONAL
Phone Number: _-/3_g "/ I/_?y_
Please use additional sheets with your name on them if necessary!

USE OF ARIES AND HARP
QUESTIONAIRE FOR
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
EL617 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM, FARMINGDALE, APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shooman, Farmingdale
RM222 or Ms. Jo Ann McDonald RM250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and
modeling flexibility of the ARIES and HARP fault-tolerant computing programs. Sometimes
you will be asked to comment from the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a
practicing professional.
1. Education
Degree Year Completed School
(or expected)
Po
Concentration Area
I
°
Full Time Part Time EE CS MS Phd. Other
Employment
Full Time Part Time Full Time Student Work Summers
F'_" _ _ _'r'- V'_._ r.,_Company:
Job Title:
3. Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis.
.
Course work: VerytdExperienced Experienced
Y'Some Knowledg-'e- First Course
Describe academic exper'--[ence: P(_o_t _'zA -, .__r_c:_.___Tl_..-_)_..c_:.___C_'5
Professional Experience: Very Experienced Experienced
_/Some Knowledge'--
First Course
Describe work experience: _/_,_,_,_ ._ /_._-'I,_,_, =,=_" /'r7"7"..'_"
_Y
Computer Expe_,e
Hardware: ,_ Main Frame
a,
__.;o, __/wo,ks tionSpecial
Level:
Software:
_Ve_xperienced Experienced
-_'_me Knowledge _ginner
_DOS __NIX //VMS __Xwindows Other
Level: .Ve_,¥ Experienced Experienced
_.__ome Knowledge _Beginner

'. E_eriences with ARIES /
Worked well Satisfactory / Fair Poor
E_--eriences with HARP--/ -- . ,--
Worked well _ Satisfactory Falr /--Poor
Ho_-useful was the Do_entation on ARIES // /
The users manual Good Satisfactory Fair___Poor //
The material from-ShoomanTss Notes. Good Satisfactory ,_Fair Poor
. How useful was the Documentation on HA_
The tutorial. --Good Satisfactory / Fair Poor
The material from Shoom-an's notes: --G_d S_isfactory /__Fair Poor
Describe any errors or problems you had with ARIES: _ ,
0. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
ii. How could ARI_S, be improved?
12. How coul_ HARP be imprgv_d?
_ _ _ _) ..... /
evaluating-an_d improving ARIES and HARP: Yes __Maybe /__No4.-_0 evaAua
PTIONAL
Name: Address: ,.
Phone Number: /
Please use additional sheets with your name on them if necessary!

USE OF ARIES AND HARP QUESTIONAIRE FOR:
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
EL617 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM FARMINGDALE APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shopman, Farmingdale Room 222 or Ms. JoAnn
McDonald Room 250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gathei- information on the ease of use, accuracy, and modeling flexibility
of the ARIES and HARP fault-tolerant computing programs, Sometimes you will be asked to comment from
the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a practicing professional.
1. Education:
Degree Year Completed
(or expected)
Ms_ / ,7f
School
t
Concentration Area
.
Full Time
Employment:
V/Full Time
Company:
Part Time EE _//CS /MS _ '//Ph.D. Other:.
Part Time b/Full Time Student Work Summers
t
Job Title:
. Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis:
Course work: Very Experienced _ Experienced
Describe academic experience:
Some Knowledge First Course
,
Professional Experience:
Very Experienced
Describe work experience: _.'I:'_L/_6_
/
Computer Experience:
Hardware: Main Frame
Some Knowledge First Coursej_..Experienced
Mini V/ PC/XT/AT Work Station Special
_/ Experienced __.__Some Knowledge BeginnerLevel: Very Experienced
Software: Vt DOS Vt UNIX VMS
Level: Very Experienced et Experienced
Xwindows Other
.._._Some Knowledge Beginner
.01

5. Experiences with ARIES:
Worked well __Satisfactory Fair
6. Experiences with HARP:.
Worked well _ Satisfactory Fair
7. How useful was the Documentation on ARIES:
The Users Manual: Good V / Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's Notes: .._Good
8. How useful was the Documentation on HARP:.
The tutorial: V/...__..Good ___.___tisfactory
The material from Shooman's notes: d Good
9. Describe any errors or problems you had with aries:
Fair
Satisfactory
Poor
Fa_ Poor
Fair Poor
Satisfactory Fair Poor
#
,.cY-: d'_.,.t-l_._' _.2' ,-':/_'f'
I0. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
II. How could ARIES be improved?
# t"1
/
12. How could HARP be improved?
13. Would you be interested in doing a project or thesis for credition evaluating and improving ARIES and
HARP:
Yes WMaybe No
4

14.
15.
Optional
Name: _q,_
Phone Number:/:5/_)cO:,2-,,2__.
Add|tlonalComments:
Address:_' _h_LLV#_.__ .jjY'O_"_ A/Y//'_/
Use additionalsheetsifnecessary.

USE OF ARIES AND HARP QUESTIONAIRE FOR:
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
EL617 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM FARMINGDALE APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L.-Shooman, Farmingdale Room 222 or Ms. JoAnn
McDonald Room 250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and modeling flexibility
of the ARIES and HARP fault-tolerant computing programs. Sometimes you will be asked to comment from
the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a practicing professional.
1. Education:
Degree Year Completed School Concentration Area
(or expected)
t_, -_,-2, =, __ :_ _ !'_2o,',_--_',_ :. _--___
.
Full Time _j_.Part Time ....LEE CS MS _.._Ph.D. Other:.
Employment:
___LFull Time Part Time ._..,._Full Time Student
"-x i
Company: ,,LJO _ _ J_-z,_,r,, _ : ','¢ ,_--v-_.
l
Job Title: _ _/_ -;ca i2_._,.'_ -"
Work Summers
Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis:
Course work: Very Experie,,ced ._,_..Experienced Some Knowledge First Course
Describe academic experience:
Professional Experience:
____Very Experienced Experienced
Describe work experience: _v_-_ _J_,t ,;
.
4. Computer Experience:
Hardware:
Level:
Software:
Level:
Some Knowledge First Course
-_-;/-_-te.-,,t_ ) ,
Main Frame Mini xC/'PC/XT/AT Work Station
Very Experienced _.__.Experienced Some Knowledge
____DOS ____UNIX VMS J Xwindows Other
Very Experienced ___Experienced Some Knowledge
Special
Beginner
Beginner

. Experiences with ARIES:
Worked well ___, Satisfactory Fair
. Experiences with HARP'.
___2L_gorked well Satisfactory Fair
. How useful was the Documentation on ARIES:
/ .
The Users Manual: Good .__._LSatisfactory
The material from Shooman's Notes: _.____.Good
Fair
Satisfactory
8. How useful was the Documentation on HARP:
The tutorial: ...__ Good Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's notes: _/Good
Poor
Fair
. Describe any errors or problems you had with aries:
Poor
Fair Poor
Satisfactory Fair Poor
10. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP: .,
11. How could ARIES be improved?
C2
12. How could HARP be improved?
13. Would you be interested in doing a project or thesis for credition evaluating and improving ARIES and
HARP:
Yes ,___Maybe No

14. Optional
Name:
Phone Number:
I5. Additional Comments:
Address:
Use additional sheets if necessary.

USE OF ARIES AND HARP
QUESTIONAIRE FOR
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
EL6[ 7 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM, FARMINGDALE, APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shopman, Farmingdale
RM222 or Ms. Jo Ann McDonald RM250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and
modeling flexibility of the ARIES and HARP fault-tolerant computing programs. Sometimes
you will be asked to comment from the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a
practicing professional.
I. Education
Degree Year Completed School
(or expected)
g5 J_, _ _90
Concentration Area
"//Full Time
2. Employment
Part Time "/EE CS MS Phd. Other
Full Time
Company:.
Job Title:
Part Time Full Time Student Work Summers
3. Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis.
Course work: Ver_' Experienced Experienced
V Some Knowledg--e- mFirst Course
Describe academic experience:Tb,,jT,.,_._od, u,t,_q_ _o _,o'_ _.'o, _ ',/
Professional Experience: Very Experienced Experienced
Some Knowledge
First Course
Describe work experience:
. Computer Experience
Hardwarei V/Main Frame
Level: Very Experienced
v' Some Knowledge
Software: v/"DOS V t UNIX
Level: _Very Experienced
¢__..some Knowledge
Mini ¢/PC/XT/AT w/"Work Station Special
wExperienced
Beginner
V/ VMS Xwindows
Experienced
Beginner
Other

Experiences with ARIES .JFaira
Worked well Satisfactory __
. E_riences with HARP_
Worked well Satisfactory Fair
• How---useful was the Do_entation on ARIES
Poor
--Poor
The users manual Good ___Satisfactory Fair Poor
The material from_hooman's Notes: Good ___Sati-_factory Fair Poor
• How useful wasjthe Documentation o_-HARP
The tutorial: J-Good Satisfactory Fai_ __Poor
The material from Shoo_n's notes: --Good v__satlsfactory Fair Poor
• .D_scribe any errors or problems you had with ARIES:
0. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
11. How could ARIES be improved?
12. How could HARP be improved?
evaluating and improving ARIES and HARP: Yes __Maybe No
.4. OPTIONAL
Name: Address:
Phone Number:
Please use additional sheets with your name on them if necessary!

USEOF ARIESAND HARP
QUESTIONAIRE FOR
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
EL617 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM, FARMINGDALE, APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shopman, Farmingdale
RM222 or Ms. Jo Ann McDonald RM250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and
modeling flexibility of the ARIES and HARP fault=tolerant computing programs. Sometimes
you will be asked to comment from the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a
practicing professional.
1. Education
Degree Year Completed School
-(or expected)
 clcs fo./ t<?,<7o
Concentration Area
.£d"Full Time Part Time _/'EE CS MS Phd. Other
. Employment
Full Time
Company:
Job Title:
Part Time Full Time Student _ork Summers
/,3 "
. Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis.
Course work: Very Experienced 3_xperienced
..__Some Knqwleflge First Coqrse__,
Describe academic experience: lt_2,.,c_ ,6__cd_-._ -b_ _ C__
Professional Experience: Very Experienced _Experienced
Some Knowledge
Describe work experience: _-,.._ /h_,_t//O_Or, First _ourse ,
4. Computer Experience
Hardware: _ Main Frame /
Mini _PC/XT/AT Work Station _ Special
Level:
Software:
Level:
Very Experienced Experienced
___Some Knowledge __'_eginner
,_"_S SIX __VMS __Xwindows
Very Experienced _Experienced
,_._Some Knowledge Beginner
Other

Experiences with ARIES /
Worked well Satisfactory _/Fair Poor
• E_riences with HARP /
__Worked well _Satisfactory Fair --Poor
• How useful was the Documentation on ARIES
Fair PoorThe users manual Good _atisfacto_y __ __
The material from Shooman's Notes: _Good Satisfactory Fair Poor
. How useful was_he Documentation on HARP
The tutorial: _/-Good Satisfactor_._ Fair Poor
The material from Shoo_n's notes: i_/G_d S_isfactory Fair Poor
• DescribQ any err.ors Or, problems You had with ARIES:
_o+- _ie_/_,_¢' ¢_-._--_ ,-¢-_ ]
0. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
_/_-__- _'Lo_
M_m_O ?-oo __o_t o_ _c_ _ Z_,, _ Z-T _o_-
11. How could ARIES be improved?
I
12.
4._ OPTIONAL . • -- .... -- --
| Phone Number: _16-¢79-_'7_7 - - '
Please use additional sheets with your name on them if necessary!

USE OF ARIES AND HARP
QUESTIONAIRE FOR
CS907 FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING
EL617 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM, FARMINGDALE, APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shopman, Farmingdale
RM222 or Ms. Jo Ann McDonald RM250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuiacy, and
modeling flexibility of the ARIES and HARP fault-tolerant computing programs. Sometimes
you will be asked to comment from the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a
practicing professional.
1. Education
Degree Year Completed School
(or expected)
Concentration Area
Full Time .)q'Part Time _ EE CS MS Phd. Other
. Employment
____"Full Time Part Time Full Time Student Work Summers
Company: 6C _a,o-,,_ _ fJob Title: rot_',m.',. _e_ .ox,o
3. Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis.
4. Computer Experience
Hardware:
Level:
Course work: Very Experienced >( Experienced
Some Knowledg-e" First Course
Describe academic exper-"ience: _ _ c>--,.,,_ ,.-, g----4-
tJ /
Professional Experience: Very Experienced Experienced
.>< Some Knowledge
First Course
Describet,,,_,..6_.g_..Z.._workexperience:_q_.=,_O,_ _ _e_. /__%_._ or_
o
"_ Main Frame
..___Mini "_-"TC/XT/AT ,_-Work Station
_Very Experienced Experienced
Some Knowledge Beginner
......_DOS _._UNIX "/ VMS ..._Xwindows _ Other
.£___Very Experienced Experienced
Some Knowledge Beginner
Software:
Level:
_pecial

i. Experiences with ARIES
XWorked well Satisfactory Fair Poor
i. Experiences with HARP
Worked well /Satisfactory Fair --Poor
• How--useful was the Do_entatlon on _ES
The users manual Good ><'Satisfactory Fair Poor
The material from_hoomanT_s Notes: XGood--Sat_factory Fair Poor
• How useful was the Documentation on HARP
The tutorial: --Good _Satisfactory Fair Poor
The material from Shooman's notes: --Go-od Sa-tisfactory_Fair Poor
• Describe any errors or problems you had with ARIES:
0. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
,
11. How could ARIES be improved?
12. How could HARP be improved?
evaluating and improving ARIES and HARP: Yes ___Maybe No
4. OPTIONAL
Name: __/_ _ /_v_t_ Address: J_-_._ _'_ /_-._ _._ _'_ '._/'_
[ Phone Number: -_/_-_-?_
Please use additional sheets with your name on them if necessary!

USE OF ARIES AND HARP QUESTIONAIRE FOR:
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EL617 SYSTEM RELIABILITY
SPRING TERM FARMINGDALE APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shopman, Farmingdale Room 222 or Ms. JoAnn
McDonald Room 250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and modeling flexibility
of the ARIES and HARP fault-tolerant computing programs. Sometimes you will be asked to comment from
the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a practicing professional.
!. Education:
Degree Year Completed School
(or expected)
Concentration Area
'C.. t _ "
.
.
, |
Full Time ___art Time EE ___CS MS
Employment:
__@ull Time
Company:
Part Time Full Time Student
e
JobTitle: --
Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis:
Course work: Very Experienced Experienced
Ph.D. Other.
Work Summers
/v'e-z(',...
-_Some Knowledge
Describe academic experience:
First Course
/
.
Professional Experience:
Very Experienced
Describe work experience:
Experienced __Some Knowledge
Computer Experience:
Hardware: Main Frame
First Course
?
,Z
Mini ____PC/XT/AT
Level: .rd,___Very Experienced N] Experienced Some Knowledge
Software: .X2. DOS '_,__./_/UNIX _._ VMS ',_Xwindows .__1 Other
Level: Very Experienced .._Experienced .._.._Some Knowledge
..xJ...Work Station _.Special
Beginner
Beginner
1.; '. t ,..,, .
b°

..
Experiences with ARIES:
Worked well _x_._Satisfactory Fair
Experiences with HARP:
/
Worked well ____Satisfactory Fair
7. How useful was the Documentation on ARIES:
.
The Users Manual: ___Good Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's Notes:. Good
How useful was the Documentation on HARP:
/
The tutorial: Good ...__.Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's notes: Good
Fair
__Satisfactory
Fair Poor
___Satisfactory
Poor
Fair Poor
Fair Poor
9. Describe any errors or problems you had with aries:
'I 4 J
kd
I0. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:.
d _.; (J ' _.1 • " -
11. How could ARIES be improved? _')
0 '
©
12. How could HARP be improved?
i3. Would you be interested in doing a project or thesis for credition evaluating and improving ARIES and
HARP:
Yes Maybe __No

14. Optional
Name:
Phone Number:
15. Additional Comments:
Address:
Use additional sheets if necessary.
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1. Education:
Degree Year Completed School
(or expected)
9%0
..,t ,
Concentration Area
Co_-,_: %c, "-,',"-:-C.
.
.
Full Time _Part Time EE _/"CS MS Ph.D. Other:.
Employment:
',/Full Time Part Time
Company:
Full Time Student Work Summers
Job Title:
Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis:
Course work: Very Experienced Experienced Some Knowledge '_" First Course
Describe academic experience:
Professional Experience:
Very Experienced
Describe work experience:
Experienced _....__Some Knowledge _/FFirst Course
. Computer Experience:
Hardware: Main Frame Mini _PC/XT/AT Work Station Special
Level: _Very Experienced Experienced Some Knowledge Beginner
Software: ",/DOS UNIX VMS Xwindows Other
Level: N.//"Very Experienced Experienced _..._Some Knowledge Beginner

..
7.
.
Experiences with ARIES:
Worked well k//Satisfactory Fair
Experiences with HARP:
Worked well Satisfactory _Fair
How useful was the Documentation on ARIES:
The Users Manual: Good Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's Notes: Good
_Fair
X/Satisfactory
Poor
Fair Poor
How useful was the Documentation on HARP:
The tutorial: Good X/Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's notes: _Good
Fair Poor
__.___Satisfactory Fair Poor
9. Describe any errors or problems you had with aries:
10. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
How could ARIES be improved?11.
12. How could HARP be improved?
.._9
-- f_,xx-_ ',,o, <j-..'.-.¢ _., _',--ro-,.v,-.. -
13. Would you be interested in doing a project or thesis for credltion evaluating and improving ARIES and
HARP:
Yes Maybe _'fNo

14. Optional
Name: _ _r_S_n_ _a_
Phone Number: _ Co -_ c_ G - ¢o _'_
15. Additional Comments:
Address: 9_'_*.-- $o..£&_v,_. _._.
Use additional sheets if necessary.

USE OF ARIES AND HARP QUESTIONAIRE FOR:
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SPRING TERM FARMINGDALE APRIL 25, 1990
When completed please return this questionaire to Prof. M. L. Shopman, Farmingdale Room 222 or Ms. JoAnn
McDonald Room 250.
The purpose of this questionaire is to gather information on the ease of use, accuracy, and modeling flexibility
of the ARIES and HARP fault-tolerant computing programs. Sometimes you will be asked to comment from
the viewpoint of a graduate student and sometimes as a practicing professional.
I. Education:
Degree Year Completed
(or expected)
65 1995
School
_._._ w,;___, _/
Concentration Area
Full Time _..l_art Time EE CS MS Ph.D. Other:.
2. Employment:
_/"Full Time Part Time
Company:6,-_ ,,,.,._.,, ,_ ,_-.,_-f-f _c_._t_._,,_-
Job Title: _,_d,_Le_---" .-_ _ _-,_e-t,_e_,a.,_"
3. Past Experience with reliability or probabilistic analysis:
Course work: Very Experienced Experienced
Describe academic experience: T,_ c._,,rse.s ;,,_
Full Time Student Work Summers
._==__ome Knowledge First Course
Professional Experience:
Very Experienced
Describe work experience:
Experienced Some Knowledge First Course
. Computer Experience:
Hardware: _._Main Frame
Level: ___ery Experienced vfExperienced
Software: .___DOS _._UNIX _/'VMS
Level: _/Very Experienced Experienced
J Mini ,/PC/XT/AT Work Station
Some Knowledge
Xwindows Other
Some Knowledge
Special
Beginner
Beginner

5. Experiences with ARIES:
Worked well /Satisfactory __Fair
6. Experiences with HARP:
Worked well v/" Satisfactory __Fair
7. How useful was the Documentation on ARIES:
The Users Manual: Good Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's Notes: Good
8. How useful was the Documentation on HARP:
The tutorial: Good /Satisfactory
The material from Shooman's notes: /Good
9. Describe any errors or problems you had with aries:
_/'Fair
,/.__...__tisfactory
Fair Poor
Satisfactory
Poor
Fair
Fair
Poor
Poor
10. Describe any errors or problems you had with HARP:
11. How could ARIES be improved?
12. How could HARP be improved?
13. Would you be interested in doing a project or thesis for credition evaluating and improving ARIES and
HARP:
Yes Maybe /No

14.
[5.
Optional
Name: "_ _ _ _P-_ _w"
Phone Number: _7...(_--(_7. o
AdditionalComments:
Address:
Use additionalsheets ifnecessary.

Question 1
Question 2
Questions 3)4
Reliability/
Prob. Courses
Reliability/
Prob. Work
Computers
Questions 5)6
ARIES
HARP
TABLE A-5 Summary of Responses to the Questionnaire
Degree level
Expecting an MSEE this year - 4
Expecting an MSEE in the next few years - 2
Expecting an MSCS this year - 2
Working toward a PhdEE - 2
Expecting a BSEE this year - 2
Employers
Full time Poly Undergraduates - 2
Full time Poly Fellow
Companies:
Harris
Standard Microsystems
Grumman Corporation - 3
Ferrant-Venus
NYNEX
Syltel Industrial Systems
Gull Electronic Systems
Experience with Reliability and Computers
Very Exp. Experienced Some Know.
0 5 4
First Course
I 2 4 5
4 5 3 0
Overall Experience with ARIES and HARP
Worked Well Satisfactory Fair
2 7 3
1 8 2
Poor
0
1
Questions 7,8 Documentation for ARIES and HARP
Good Satisfactory Fair Poor
ARIES
Manual 1 2 6 3 1
Notes 2 5 5 2 0
HARP
Manual s 4 7 1 0
Notes 4 8 2 2 0
1 Prof. Shooman wrote a 20 page summary of ARIES.
2 Prof. Shooman supplied course notes including a few simple ARIES examples.
s Photocopies of the HARP Tutorial (Rothman 1989) were distributed to all students.
4 Prof. Shooman supplied a script of a session showing how to describe a simple problem to
ARIES.
APPENDIX B
DETAILS OF THE INSTALLATION OF HARP ON POLYTECHNIC COMPUTERS
B-I
APPENDIX B
The test of installation ease was to be carried out by installing the HARP program on the
Poly Gould computer operating under the Unix operating system. This test was carried out by
Martin Shopman (who has no system programming experience) with the occasional help of a
senior systems programmer (a unix expert and a VMS beginner) and a junior systems
programmer (an intermediate in unix and a beginner in VMS).
It was assumed that the initial tapes for HARP which were received in June 1989 were
compatible with a "general Unix" system and only minor modifications would be required to
make it compatible with the Poly Gould computer.
Our initial tests went slowly because of some differences in the file names between the
HARP manual and the names used on the tape. These difficulties were resolved by determining
the equivalencies via reading the heading text in each file and determining equivalencies for the
three major programs. The files were then renamed eare3.f, carein.f, and covrge.f to
correspond to the manual.
The next step was to compile these three major programs using the Gould Fortran
compiler. Compilation took 20-30 minutes for each program and resulted in several warnings
and one major error. The error turned out to be an illegal in line comment in Gould Fortran
(apparently it was legal in VAX Fortran) which was "!ANNA should this be KP'. This was
changed to a comment on the next line. The program then compiled.
Attempts to execute the compiled files resulted in system errors which could not be
resolved. Perhaps the program was looking for VMS libraries which did not exist on the Poly
computer.
A call to Rudy Williams of NASA Langley suggested that the tapes I had were probably
not Unix versions but VMS versions which were made Unix readable but not compatible with
Unix. The conversion of the HARP programs from VMS to Unix had bee_'--assigned as a full
time task to one of the Airlab system programmers.
Subsequent calls to Sai Bavuso verified that I did not have a Unix version of the program
and he promised to send me a Unix version when available.
In the interim Shooman obtained a HARP account on the NASA Langley Airlab computer
and connected to HARP from Poly terminals and PC's via the internet network. Shooman
considered trying the PC version of HARP, however, this would require the following:
(a) Lahey Fortran Compiler 3.01
(b) MS-DOS Linker
(c) Lattice MS-DOS C Compiler Ver. 3.0
(d) MS-DOS Ver. 3.2
(e) GSS*GKS Graphics Package 2.02
We had copies at Poly of item (d) and probably (c) but not (a), (b), and (e) thus no further
investigations of PC HARP were attempted.
Once I received the Unix HARP version (uxharp-61), I attempted (without success) to
compile, link, and load the three major programs, fiface, harpeng, and tdrive. The problem
was to do an error (incompatibility) between the different versions of Fortran (see Table B.I for
complete details). Once the Fortran incompatibility was solved all three programs compiled and
linked in 5-12 minutes. Execution of tdrive checked with the results of the same execution on
the Langley computer. Unfortunately fiface and harpeng gave system errors which were never
resolved and testing continued via a network connection to the Langley computer. The
procedure was to enter Shooman's account (or the student's accounts on the Gould computer),
connect to the Langley computer via the Telnet network and then log into the Langley computer
and run HARP. This worked well except for some delays in the network connections.
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The conclusion of these tests is that the versions of HARP which were then available were
not easily transportable to a Unix machine unless the services of a dedicated and experienced
systems programmer were available. Shooman called a colleague who is a reliability analyst at
Grumman Aircraft and was told that their initial installation of HARP (VMS version) on a
VAX running VMS took about one day of time for an experienced system programmer.
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Table B-I (E-Mail from John Buck)
From john Fri Mar 9 12:59:30 1990
Received: by polyof.poly.edu (4.12/UTX/32 1.2)
id AA10886; Fri, 9 Mar 90 12:54:43 est
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 90 12:54:43 est
From: john ( John Buck )
Message-Id: <9003091754.AA 10886@polyof.poly.edu>
Re: fortran problem you have been having
Apparently-To: shopman
Status: RO
The problem is with the fortran compiler, but there is a workaround...
(It is gonna take some time for me to fix the compiler (a couple of
days at least)), so you may want to consider working around the problem.
Any piece of code like:
IF(condition)THEN
label statement
statement
IF(condition)THEN
statement
GOTO label
ENDIF
ENDIF
will cause the problem. The compiler maps the "label" (whatever number
the user chose) into some internal LABEL, like L32 or L545 for example.
The problem is, if a label appears immediately after something like
a THEN, ELSE, WHILE, DO, etc. the compiler forgets to generate a label
for it, and when you do a GOTO later, it is (obviously) undefined.
The workaround is to put a CONTINUE before the label statement, like:
label
IF(condition)THEN
CONTINUE
statement
statement
IF(condition)THEN
statement
GOTO label
ENDIF
ENDIF
This works. The problem is finding all the places in your code
where this happens... I fixed one in nxt.f, around lines 166-175
I added the CONTINUE and the L32 message (one of them) went away.
I will let you know as soon as I fix (or find) the problem with the
compiler.
B-4
APPENDIX C
DETAILS COMMENTS ON PROBABLISTIC MODELING WITH HARP
C-I
C.I REVIEW OF THE PAPER BY HAYHURST ET AL.
"A Critical Assessment of the HARP Program," Kelly J. Hayhurst, Rickey W. Butler, and Sally
C. Johnson, Draft NASA Technical Memorandum 102607, NASA Langley, Feb. 1990.
This is a very interesting report which provides much valuable material on how the HARP
program works, how to model fault-tolerant systems with the program and the limitations of the
program. The following comments are offered to improve the clarity and expand some sections
of the repor.t. The major comments deal with the mathematics, structure, or understanding of
the program, whereas, the minor comments are mainly editorial in nature.
1. P3
2. p5
3. 05
4. p6
MAJOR COMMENTS
"1.3 The Assessment Approach" The 4 stages of verification mentioned are good,
however, they all seem to imply that HARP will be critiqued on an absolute basis. I
think there should also be some relative basis to the discussion. For example, suppose
that the only present alternatives to using HARP are to use CARE III or to make
various rough analytical approximations. If these are truly the "generally available"
alternatives, then HARP, even with its warts may be more attractive on a relative
basis than on an absolute one. You can comment better than I on what the "practical"
alternatives are and we can both comment on how well one can do with analytical
approximations.
To really understand how HARP works, it is necessary to briefly define the following
terms and give a simple example of each: Fault-Occurrence Model, Fault Error
Handling Model, Interfering Components Specification, Instantaneous Jump Model,
Behavioral Decomposition. These definitions and explanations may be in White's
report, however, some explanation is needed in this report unless the reader is
expected to have read White's report first.
(a) The term conservative is not well defined. I prefer to use the terms optimistic
and pessimistic and apply them to the system reliability. Then optimistic means
an upper bound on the system reliability and pessimistic means a lower bound
on the system reliability. Since the HARP answer is an upper bound on the
probability of failure, (UB_y,)*, it is also a lower bound (pessimistic) on the
reliability which is good.
* The notation UBsy s is confusing since it refers to the system probability of
failure rather than the system success.
(b) It is always nice to have in addition to the pessimistic bound an optimistic
upper bound on the system reliability, which would be a lower bound on the
system probability of failure, and I assume this would be called LB,y, to be
consistent with the HARP notation. The existence of both upper and lower
bounds on reliability allows one to bracket the true reliability and calculate
error bounds.
(a) The term unreliability is used here as a synonym for system probability of
failure, which is correct, however, there are enough problems with notation,
thus system probability of failure should be used instead.
(b) It is hard to understand exactly what bounds on the Instantaneous Jump Model,
(UBii m and LBijm) , represent since the instantaneous jump model has not been
defified, nor hag the behavioral decomposition process. For example:
(1) If there are NO approximations involved in the decomposition process,
then an upper bound on the decomposed model reliability is an upper
bound on the system reliability.
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5. p7
6. p7
(2) If the decomposition process produces a decomposed model which is itself
an upper bound on the actual model, then an upper bound on the
decomposed model reliability is an upper bound (perhaps a loose one,
perhaps reasonably tight), on the system reliability.
(3) If the decomposition process produces a decomposed model which is itself
a lower bound on the actual model, then an upper bound on the
decomposed model reliability may or may not be a bound on the system
reliability.
(4) If the decomposition process produces an approximate model which is not
necessarily an upper or lower bound on the actual model, then an upper
bound on the decomposed model reliability may or may not be a bound on
the system reliability.
(c) "The UBij m is based on the same concept as UBjv s and is CLAIMED* to be an
upper bound on system unreliability." Why do-we need a second bound on
system unreliability? Is UBij m a sharper bound? is it easier to calculate?
* Why use the word CLAIMED and cast doubt on the validity of UBij m when
two sentences below the authors state "the validity of the bounds .... are not in
dispute?"
(d) The following wording pertaining to the issues raised in (b) and (c) above seems
clearer to me, is it correct?
(1) There are some bounds which establish the validity of the HARP model,
however, there is not a complete set of bounds.
(2) A upper bound on the system failure probability, UB,y s, (lower bound on
the system reliability), has been developed by McGough and Trivedi,
unfortunately a flaw has been found in his proof, (is Trivedi working on
removing the flaw?), however, Alan White has found an independent
proof.
(3) The instantaneous jump model involves the following assumptions and
approximations .... ???
(4) Upper and lower bounds on the probability of failure associated with the
instantaneous jump model, UBi_ m and LBij m have been developed by
Trivedi et el. They have the ft_llowing advantages when compared with
UBsys: ....???
(5) It is difficult to convert a bound on the instantaneous jump model to a
system bound because of the assumptions and approximations which arise
in the modeling process, however Trivedi claims that UBi. m is also an
• J
upper bound on the system probability of fadure, however, no detailed
proof is given. Also there are no proofs relating LBijrn to the the system
reliability.
(e) In foot note 4, the term near-concident failures should be defined and
explained.
The term single critical-pair N-plex must be defined and examples must be given•
The explanation in footnote 6 is too short.
If I understand the given explanation of critical pair, then the example given in
Appendix C.2 may help explain the nature of the approximation. This example could
represent two redundant CPU's and two redundant memories where the "switching is
perfect."
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7. p7
8. p7,8
9. p7,8
10. p8
11. p8,9
12. pl0
13. pll
14. pll
15. p12
16. p13
17. p14
18. p14
19.
xl yl
/ ..... >.... \ / .... >..... \
/ \ / \
0 0 0
\ / \ /
\ ..... >.... / \ .... >..... /
x2 y2
Based on the example which is analyized in Appendix
unreliability are quite serious in even this simple case.
137% and 179%
C.2 the discrepanciesin
The percentage errorsare
I agree that if this is how HARP treats "critical-pairs" then it is limited in modeling
and comparing fault isolation strategies.
If all the bounds require the assumption that the system components are critically
coupled, then the bounds will only be valid for critical coupling and for any other
situation the HARP answer will be an approximation of unknown (mathematically
unbounded) accuracy.
If you have upper and lower bounds, A - el < C < A + e2, they don't have to be
symmetrical (el ffi e2) as long as both are reasonably sharp. In fact, if we are talking
about system reliability I would accept just a lower (pessimistic bound) if that was all
that was available.
Perhaps the ICSffiALL and ICS=SAME would be of some help even with the problems
cited. This needs more study.
Explain how the recovery and redundancy management unit works in the model of
Fig. 1. It seems you are saying that the recovery unit is perfect (never fails to detect
a fault and never never produces a false alarm, i.e., detects a nonexistent fault) except
when a second fault occurs before the first has been handled (recovery completed).
If this is the model, state it and explain.
Lines 9,10,IIare not clear,explain.
Give Tables with 1-2 line explanations describing the alternative fault/error-
handeling models supported by HARP and the options for ICS.
Define interfering components.
Explain in words the example of Fig. 3, and why the different types of failure rates,
or is it just a hypothetical model with no physical counterpart.
Since in some problems HARP infers the wrong failure rates for near-coincident
faults, is there any way for the analyst who knows of this problem to force the
program to use the correct rates via input?
In Table 2 you compare HARP results with the "Correct" solution. By the correct
solution I assume you mean the results of another computer program which you trust
more, or do you mean an analytical solution?
An approximate analytical solution is given for the example in Figure 4 in Appendix
C.3. The solution is based on failure modes MI, M2, M3, and M4 which correspond
to the probabilities of states 3,6,9, and 11 of Figure 4. The results for Mission time
ffi10 are:
P(MI) ffi5.9901008 x 10ll
P(MS) = 1.7946 x IOis
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20. p15
21. p16
22. p17
23. p17
24. p18
25. p18
P(M3)
P(MI) + P(M2) + P(M3)
P(M4)
= 1.8x 1016
= 6.008972 x I0al
= 1.7919187 x 1011
P(MI) + P(M2) + P(M3) + P(M4) = 7.8008907 x 1011
Based upon these approximate analyticalresultsand the unknown source of the
column labeledCorrect in Table 2, I am not sure which set of resultsI would label
correct.(NOTE: See comment 39!)
Next to last line: "unless two faults occur coincidently." What happens then?
Footnote 8. I agree that when you have reliability values where R is close to one
you should compare U = I-R. The percentage difference between UI and U2 is
what is used in the report, [IUI-U21/UI] x 100%. However, if UI and U2 differ
by an order of magnitude or more, the ratio UI/U2 is probably better to use. Note
in no case would I use the term incorrect for either U I or U2 unless I had an
analytical solution that I was sure of or a correspondence of several independent
(algorithms and code) computer solutions.
Middle of page. "the problem manifests itself with less extreme values of the
parameters." Reword for more clarity.
Last line. "letting Pt = Probability that T exit (Transient) is taken, we have:"
Explain what this means.
I agree with the reasoning of Section 3.5
Next to last line. "consisting of three independent triads to the HARP program.
What does this mean. Is the example shown below a triad? Does independence
mean that CPU, memory and I/O failures are all independent?
zl xl yl
/ ..... • .... \ / ..... • .... \ / .... • ..... \
/ z2 \ / x2 \ / y2 \
0 ....... • ...... 0 ........ • ...... 0 ....... • ....... 0
\ /\ /\ /
\ .... • ..... / \ ..... >---/ \ .... • ..... /
z3 x3 y3
CPU Triad Memory Triad I/O Channel Triad
26. p20
27. p20
28. p20
29. p21
30. p22
31. p23
Line 1,2 Change words? "Clearly theorem(s) or bounds are needed .... "
Middle of page. Not clear what you mean by design flaws. Does that mean the
difference between input and math domains?
Last line. "that have an intimate knowledge of the HARP tool." I strongly agree.
This is made difficult by incomplete and confusing documentation.
Middle of page "Two simultaneously failures can be accommodated." Why is this
so? Is the system a 3 out of 6 system? But that doesn't agree with Fig. 13?
Explain.
Fourth line. What does 3. A majority of .... mean? Not clear explain.
Fig. 15, the transition rate from (3,0,1) back to (4,0,0) is not labeled.
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32. p24 The description of FTMP is too terse. More words plus a system block diagram
(graph) using the type of symbols shown below (or an equivalent type of diagram)
with additional words annotating the diagram would help a lot. This same
comment applies to the discussion at the top of page 27. Show a model of a 6-
plex, redundant power supplies.
/1\ xl yl
I / ..... >.... \ / .... >..... \
I / \/ \
On line system 0 0 0
I \ x2 / \ y2 /
\II \.....>....I \....>.....I
33. p27
34. p27
35. p27
36. p28
37. p28
38. p29
39. p30
40. p30
41. p31.
x3 y3
Ilk 0....>....0 0....>....0
Spares 0 .... > .... 0
\1/ y4
Explain the terms NMR, multiple triads, multiple quads, critical pair N-plex.
Last paragraph and footnote. Isn't this the sum of the number of combinations of
71 taken O,l,2,and 3 at a time? I think this yields 1 + 71 + 4,970 + 57,155 = 62,190
= 62K?
Would anyone ever want to solve a model with over 1,000 states? This would
require the input of several hundred values for transition rates (very laborious) and
how would one ever get data for so many parameters? Perhaps I am overlooking
some classes of models. Can anyone suggest a practical problem of very large size?
Fig. 19 Add additional labels in ( ) to 2000, 4000, 6000 seconds points, (33 min.),
(67 rain.), (100rain.).
Fig. 19. One can very crudely fit a model to the curve. Choose the form T = KS 2.
Fit at 100 states and 700 seconds, which yields K = .07. Then at 200 states the
formula predicts 2800 see., and at 300 states 6300 seconds. Both the predicted
points are approximately on the curve. A better fit could be obtained by plotting
the data on semilog paper.
Perhaps one could get analytical solutions for some of these problems.
You state that these models have an exponential recovery rate. This seems
different than the assumptions used in Chap. 3 and 4, where I assumed you were
talking about a fixed recovery time. It makes a difference in the analytical
solution. For example in Appendix B, one would have to compute the probability
that the random variable time to next failure exceeds the random variable recovery
time. (This is a standard computation which involves the convolution integral or
any of several other change of random variable techniques). Stating the mean
recovery time may imply an exponential or a normal recovery distribution. You
have to be specific. All three variations could be analytically computed in the
simpler cases.
Give a graph for Example 5.1 and the other examples similar to that in comment
32.
One can solve the Markov model for Fig. 20.
requires solving 8 first order differential
transforms help organize the algebra.
It is not too difficult but long and
equations with drivers. Laplace
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42. p31
43.p32
44. p33
45. p34
46.p35,40
47.p41
48.p47
49.p47
50. p.47ff.
The results in Table 7 are quite convincing and lead one to believe that SURE,
PAWS, and STEM agree and give the right answer, and that often HARP differs
from the right answer. However, if SURE, PAWS, and STEM all share the same
basic model formulation philosophy and differ mainly in the way numerical
approximations are made, then the results are not 3 versus one but 3 dependent
ones reducing to one versus one. Of course if the modeling philosophy and
algorithms of SURE, PAWS, and STEM are really all different then it is 3 versus
one. Maybe an analytical solution for a few of these problems is worth the effort?
Figure 21 describes a situation with two types of faults, "hard" faults and transient
faults? Explain. In 5.3 you discuss permanent faults. Are these yet a third
category? Explain.
Fig. 21, the "feedback paths" created by the transient fault-recovery rate couples
the differential equations (the same way repair does) and makes solution harder,
but still possible. (See comment 41.)
Can we show why HARP differs so much for small failure rates? Would
comparison with an analytic solution help? (See Tables 7, 9, 10).
80,000 % error? This is inconsistent with what you say on p16. Also see comment
21. Also holds for Table 16,17,18 and others.
Equation given only holds if E 1 and E 2 are independent, probably a good
assumption except for electrostatic discharge, common power supplies, etc.
"the answers given by the other analysis tools were in complete agreement." See
comment 42.
"Consequently, even an experienced user of HARP unaware of all the subtleties of
the program could easily generate wrong answers .... This is especially true because
the documentation is sparse, hard to understand, incomplete, and has some errors.
The new "nonstandard" gates. These gates are designed to deal with dependent
failures and sequenced events. Since, the definition and use of these gates is not
clear it would seem they are of limited usefulness. All the situations where these
gates would be used can be easily formulated using a Markov model. For an
example of such Markov dependency models see Shopman (1990, pp. 235, 236,
243-251 ).
C-7
I.pl
2.pl
3. p2
4. p3
5. p4
6. p6
7. pl0
8. pl0
9. pll
10. p22
11. p18
MINOR COMMENTS
"Several different types of fault-tolerant computing systems are currently in use ..."
I doubt that these programs are as widely used as either the authors or I would
wish.
"Mathematical techniques such as k-out-of, n ..... ". Give some standard textbook
references to the techniques.
"... HARP has been widely publicized ..." I am not sure that your beta-test sites use
it that widely?
"Would it be clearerif the fourth problem area was called(4) reliabilitymodeling
with HARP fault-trees
In footnote 1, differential equations solvers are dismissed as competitors to HARP
because they only handle Markov models with constant transition rates. I am not
sure whether this is the case with modern math packages. Also one would have to
investigate the capabilities of modern math analysis programs such as MACSYMA,
MATHEMATICA, and MATLAB.
Typo in footnote 3? SIMLE should be SIMPLE?
Add a clarifying sentence after line 10? " States 3,6,8 are failed states, and F r the
recovery time distribution.
Define the terms: near-coincident, triad, system recovery, duplex, simplex.
Typo, change bahavior to behavior on lines 4 and 5.
Last paragraph. Somewhere earlier in the report you should explain that the models
you are using are based upon two major classes of failure modes (you might even
say you are ignoring other possible failure modes such as a false-alarm attempt to
recover the system) , one where all the parts fail which you call exhaustion of
parts, and one where while a recovery to a failure is in progress another failure
occurs and confounds the recovery process, which you call two coincident failures.
You really say this at the top of page 10, but you don't use the term exhaustion of
components till later. Be a little more explicit.
Note it is better if all major sections start on a new page.
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C.2 AN EXAMPLE WHICH ILLUSTRATES THE PROBLEMS WITH HARP'S TREATMENT
OF NEAR-COINCIDENT FAULTS
The following example may help explain the nature of the HARP near-coincident faults
approximation. This example could represent two redundant CPU's and two redundant
memories, where the "switching is perfect."
xl yl
/ ..... >.... \ / .... >..... \
I \I \
0 0 0
\ I\ I
\.....>....I \....>.....
x2 y2
The reliability of this system in terms of probability of success or failure is given by:
R 1 = P[xlyI + xly2 + x2yI + x2Y2]ffiI - P[x1"x2"+YI'Y2"] (1)
where P[x] is the probability that x is successful and P[x'] is the probability that x fails.
The correct reliability expression is given by Eq. (1).
HARP would evaluate this expression as:
R 2 ffi 1 - P[xl"x2"+ Yl"Y2' + xl"Yl" + xl"Y2" + x2"Yl"+ x2"Y_'] (2)
If we assume all element failures are independent and P(xl" ) = P(x_') = ql and P(Yl') ffi P(Y_') =
q2 then Eq. (1) yields:
R 1= I - ql2- q22 + (q12)(q2) (3)
The evaluation of Eq. (2) depends on how HARP works. The correct evaluation
is to expand all terms (6 singles, 15 pairs, 20 triplets, 15 quadruplets, 6 quintuplets and 1
sixtuplet) taking care to reduce terms such as P(x2"yl'x2"y_') to P(x2"yl'y2"). This yields:
R 2 = 1 - qx2- q22 - 4qxq2 + 3(q12)(q22)+6(q12)(q2) +6(ql)(qz 2)- [3 atatime]
+ [4 at a time] - [5 at a time] (4)
It is well known that if we drop all the bracketed terms then we bound R2:
R_. > 1 - ql _- - q2:1 - 4qlq 2 + 3(q12)(q22) + 6(q12)(q_.) + 6(ql)(q22) (5)
Of course HARP may choose to ignore the intersection reductions such as P(x2"yx'x_'y_') ffi
P(x_.yx'y_.), which would yield 15(qx_)(qlz _) instead of the last 3 terms in Eq. 5 (many programs
do this). HARP could also ignore anything beyond the single terms, yielding Eq. 5 with the last
3 terms deleted which now changes the inequality from a lower to an upper bound.
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Evaluationof Eqs.(3) and (5) yields:
R and I-R
ql = q2
.1
.01
Correct Model Eq.(3)
0.9799/0.0201
0.99979999/0.0002111
R and I-R
Assumed HARP Model Eq.(5)
0.9523/0.0477
0.99941203/0.00058797
Based on the above example, the discrepancies in unreliability are quite serious in even this
simple case. The percentage errors are 137% and 179%.
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C.3 AN APPROXIMATE ANALYTICAL SOLUTION FOR A TRIAD WITH A COLD SPARE
We can develop an approximate model for the probability of failure Pf ffi 1 - R for the system
model given in Fig. 4, a triad with a cold spare. We model the the probability of system failure
as a union of the four different modes of system failure, (M 1, M 2, M 3, M4), which correspond
to states 3, 6, 9, 11 in the transition diagram of Fig. 4 as follows:
Pf = 1 - R = P(M 1 + M s + M s + M 4) (6)
where
M 1 ffi
M 2 =
M s =
M 4 =
One failure and a second failure before recovery is finished = x'l.y" ,
Two failures and a third failure before recovery is finished = X'b.y"b
Three failures and a fourth failure before recovery is finished = x'c.y"c
Four failures = x"d
Substitution into Eq. 6 yields:
Pf = P(x'a.y" a + x'b.y"b + x'c.y"c + X'd) (7)
It is clear that the various modes are mutually exclusive (disjoint) since it is impossible for
example to have simultaneously one failure and four failures. Thus, we can write Eq. (7) as:
Pf = P(x'i.Y'a)+ P(X'b.Y'b)+ P(x'c.Y'c)+ P(X'd) (8)
Evaluation of Eq. (8) involves conditional probabilities, for example:
P(x'b.Y'b) = P (Two failures and a third failure before recovery is finished) (9)
and this should be expanded to read:
P(X'b.Y'b) =
P(One failure) x
P(A second failurelthat recovery of the first failure is successful) x
P(A third failure before recovery from the second failure is finished)
If we approximate this expression by assumin B independence, we ignore the
conditioning, and write Eq. (8) as:
Pf = P(x'a) x P(y'a) + P(x"b) x P(Y'b) + e(x'e) x P(Y'c) + P(X'd)
(10)
(11)
Given exponential failure and recovery distributions (constant hazards) where A is the failure
rate rate we can write for the case where A = 10-4 failures/hr., the system operating time t =
10 hr., and A fixed recovery time tr = .36/60x60 = 10 -4 hr., (NOTE: If recovery time is not
fixed but has an exponential or normal distribution, then a different computation must be used.
See comment 39)!
C-II
P(x'a) = 1 - e -sAt =
P(X'b) = (I - e-SAt) 2 =
P(x'c) = (I - e-2At)P(X'b)=
P(X'd) = (1 - e-'Xt)P(x',) =
P(Y's) = 1 - e "2_tr =
ffi 2 x I0 -a
P(Y'b) = I - e "2'_tr ffi
ffi 2X I0-s
P(Yc) = 1 - e-_tr =
= 10-s
I - e -s x io -s
(1 - e-s _ x°-s) _
I - e -2 x lO-Sp(x,b)
1 - e-l°-Sp(x'c)
1 - e -2 x I0 -8
I - e-2x 1o-s
I - e- _°-s
Substituting these values into Eq. 11 yields:
Pf =
= 0.002995504
= (0.002995504) 2
= 0.001998001 x P(X'b)
= 0.0009995 x P(x'c)
= 0.00000002
= 0.00000002
= 0.00000001
.002995504 x 2 x 10 -s + (.002995504) 2 x 2 x I0 "s + (.002995504) 9 x (.001998001) x 10 -s
+ (.002995504) 2 x (.001998001) x (.0009995) (12a)
Pf _--"
Thus, from Eq. (12b) we can write:
P(M 1)
P(M2)
P(M3)
P(MI) + P(M2) + P(M3)
P(M4)
5.991008 x 10 "11 + !.7946 x 10 -is + 1.8 x 10 -16 + 1.7919187 x 10 "11
= 5.9901008 x I0-xl
= 1.7946 x I0-xs
= 1.8 x I0-xe
= 6.008972 x I0-11
= 1.7919187 x 10-11
P(MI) + P(M2) + P(M3) + P(M4) = 7.8008907 x 10 -11
(12b)
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C.4 REVIEW OF PAPER BY WHITE
"A Review of the HARP Program: Approach and Mathematics," Allan L. White, Draft NASA
Technical Memorandum, NASA Langley, November 1989.
This paper provides insight into the mathematical background of the HARP program, and is a
very good review of the capabilities and limitations of the HARP fault-tolerant computing
program. In addition there are valuable discussions of the instantaneous-jump model, which has
importance as a modeling technique even when divorced from the HARP program. Other
valuable insights into the modeling process for fault-tolerant systems are also included. The
following comments are not offered as criticism but as suggestions for further improving the
draft of a good report. Allan White briefly responded to some of these comments by E-mail
and his note is included in Appendix C.6.
MAJOR COMMENTS
.
.
Section 2.1. Some technical terms are used in this section without definition. Although
many of the readers will know these terms, some will not. Also there are probably
different definitions or interpretations of some of these terms,
therefore please define: Markov discrete state time model, Markov continuous state time
model, Semi-Markov model, and instantaneous-jump model.
Figs. 2.1 and 2.2 and analysis in between. I think you need more detail here, this is a
very important point. The instantaneous-jump model explains a lot about what is special
about fault-tolerant computing systems modeling: Recovery from transient errors, large
and small time constants leading to "stiff equations" (if you use this term it must be
defined and explained), etc. I have tried to discuss some of these matters in Appendix
C.5.
.
.
.
Note: In Appendix C.5, I have assumed that the transient mode of failure is due to the
fact that " the system can not recover from two soft failures because the recovery unit
becomes "confused" if the second soft failure occurs before the recovery process (which
operates at a rate 6) has been completed. Is this the correct failure mode, or is it a
failure because the system eventually recovers from two transient failures but takes too
long to complete recovery and the system is down for an unacceptable time?
Section 2.3. Why do you want to convert a standard Markov model to an instantaneous
jump model? To avoid the problem of solving stiff differential equations? How about
formulating and solving a simple example of two parallel elements with recovery by
using a standard Markov model. Give actual parameters for failure rate ,_ and system
recovery rate 6. Show the solution problem with stiff equations. Make a instantaneous-
jump model and show how the problem is eased.
I have checked the validity of the instantaneous-jump transformation by deriving the
partial Markov model with and without the transformation and the results check. See
discussion in Appendix C.5.
6. Section 2.3. Define the following terms in your discussion:
a. Reconfigurable fourplex.
b. Fault-free state.
c. Recovery-mode state.
d. Coincident-fault failure state.
e. Exhaustion-of-parts failure state.
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,8.
.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Two sentences below Fig. 2.4(a). Which differential equation package?
The analytical expressions derived in Appendix C were evaluated in a small BASIC
program (see Table 1) for the numerical values given below Fig. 2.4. The results are
given in Table 2. Note that they compare well with the values given in the report,
however, the instantaneous-jump model gave identical results since the difference term,
X4 in the program, was or the order exp(-1000) which is so small it is given as zero.
Note the smallest exponential value which my scientific calculator will compute is
exp(-227) ffi2.60 x 10-_. Either there is a discrepancy in the models derived in
Appendix C, or there is computational error in the differential equation package.
Top of page above See. 2.4. If the computations in comment 8 above are correct,
perhaps the word over estimation should be changed. Definitions of 4-plex (or fourplex,
both are used?), and N-plex should be given earlier in this section.
Section 2.4, 10 lines from bottom: "The probability of system recovery is V .... " This
sentence is not clear. Is this the transition rate from state R to S shown in Fig. 2.5(a)??
Define words and notation carefully. (A real definition of V doesn't occur until one gets
to Fig. 2.8. Some of this explanation is needed here as well).
Section 2.4, next to last paragraph. Define what you mean by an active and a benign
fault? Not clear. Define all the transition parameters and explain.
Section 2.4, last paragraph. Define what you mean by a semi-Markov recovery model.
Not clear. Define all the transition parameters and explain.
Figure 2.5. I think all these models must be discussed in much more detail. I would
suggest derivations of each one using _before-and-after _ Markov models similar to what
is done in Appendix C. I think the result may be a more general statement about
instantaneous jump models. I wonder if the people who deal with still differential
equations and widely separated time constants have already done such an analysis by
focusing on the roots of the differential equations. If so, it would be very helpful to
carry this work over into the Markov modeling realm, where one has much more
modeling insight.
Below Fig. 2.5 and Fig. 2.6. Needs more explanation how models in Fig. 2.5 are
combined to yield Fig. 2.6.
Last sentence in Sec. 2.5. Is there some sort of a "Y to V _ (turn the letters on their sides)
transform going on here?
Section 2.6. Why do you use the term coverage here? Explain how its conventional
meaning is related to your usage?
Section 2.6. Where is Fig. 5?
Section 2.6. When do we need the additional complexity of a Weibull model? If we use
the correct values of failure and recovery rates, the steady state values of Markov model
probabilities should be correct. Or is this not the case with fault-tolerant system models?
Section 2.6. More explanation of FORM needed.
Fig. 2.7. Definition of E. When you first discussed exhaustion-of-parts, did you say
that you are assuming that the system fails when there is only one good system left
because you don't know which of the two remaining systems is the good one and which
is the bad one? This is only true if no human is in control, since there is a good chance
that we could switch between the two remaining systems and determine which performs
properly. This would be possible on a long term space flight, but not of course for a
dynamically unstable aircraft.
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21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
Section2.8. "The HARP construction does not always reproduce the intended reliability
model." Is the problem with the instantaneous-jump theory, or with the way HARP
implements it? Where is Fig. 8?
Fig. 2.9. It would be clearer if you labeled the figure "incorrect models produced by
errors in the HARP look ahead procedure" and gave another figure labeled "correct
models for the examples of Fig. 2.9. Doesn't ARIES avoid this problem by asking the
user to tell the program how many active elements there are after a failure and
reconfiguration?
Section 2.9. If you are willing to give the analyst the task of reducing the model by
using an instantaneous-jump transformation you avoid some of the problems caused by
asking the program to make all the decisions. Maybe what is needed is a modeling phase
where the problem is "prepared" for solution?
Above Fig. 2.9. Define what is meant by a double dual.
Section 3.1. The comment "HARP is essentially a CARE IV." is significant. It belongs
here but should also appear somewhere in the introduction as well.
Section 3.1. You are considering the occurrence of overlapping faults, a second fault
occurring before the system has finished reconfiguring in response to a first fault. Is this
an important point?
a. The probability of two such faults is low.
b. The system may be unable to handle two overlapping faults and system failure may
be the correct model.
c. Can HARP artificially terminate the first fault and work on the second?
Please comment on these three points.
27. Section 3.3. "Unfortunately, there are no results in this area." Rephrase for clarity.
28. Section 3.3. Define sojourn times. Two lines later insert word and split word? (There
ARE counter examples ...).
29.
30.
31.
32.
Section 3.4. Define the following terms: plurality voting fourplex, intermittent faults
with an active failure condition, triad plus spare, majority voting sixplex (is this another
term for 6-modular redundancy?), two triads.
I think a carefully written and comprehensive glossary of terms would be helpful in
defining the many terms which need definition. In some cases it would be helpful to
add additional definitions and discussions in the text even if a glossary is included.
Fig. 3.2. It would be helpful to add a legend to this figure (and possibly to other
figures). For example:
LEGEND
Sx = Initial system state all four elements are good
R 1 ffi One failure has occurred and recovery is in progress
S2 = etc.
etc.
Above Fig. 3.2. Let us simplify and assume that each component has a single bit output
which is either 0 or 1. Let us define the following "redundancy management rules:
a. If a failure occurs and one component disagrees with the other 3, (3-1), it is voted
out of the system (essentially its output is disconnected,
and the remaining three elements continue, forming a TMR (triple-modular or 3-modular
redundancy system, isn't this what you also call a triad?).
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33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
b. If a second failure occurs after the system has reconfigured to form a TMR system,
(2-1) the disagreeing system is not disconnected and the TMR continues until there are
two failures and system failure occurs. (Is this what you mean by 2-1-1 ?)
c. If there are initially two simultaneous failures, or two overlapping failures, (a second
before the recovery to the first is complete), the system fails. (Is this what you mean by
2-2).
If the first failure is not disconnected, the above redundancy management rules are
different. You should clarify.
Note that one can have even more complex redundancy management rules. One can
build an adaptive voter which keeps a record of how many times each component
disagrees with the majority. One the component exceeds a predecided error level, he is
disconnected from the system. Records of disagreement are still kept, and there is a
possibility that the disconnected component may score better in the future and be
rehabilitated. Can HARP model such a system?
Fig. 3.3 does not seem complete. The caption is incomplete. Out of the 7 terminal states
(right most states), 4 are unlabeled. The transition rate out of $2 is not labeled.
Fig. 3.4. What is an unmonitored vs. a monitored spare?
Fig. 3.5 and the preceding text. Define a sixplex and explain the model.
Fig. 3.6 and the preceding text. Define a two triads system and explain the model.
Section 3.5. Define what is meant by fault containment regions.
Section 3.6. Define what is meant by adjusting the critical pair list.
Fig. 3.7 and above. A system consists of ten dual processors. What does this mean? A
series model (chain model) of ten sub systems, each of which is a dual processor?
Explain the system with a reliability block diagram or a reliability graph.
Fig. 3.7 and above. Are the transition rates of 10-4 failures per hour (about one per
year) and 10+4 recoveries per hour (about three per second) typical rates?
Fig. 3.8 and above. You should give reliability graph and system redundancy
management rules to define this system.
Fig. 3.9 and above. You should give reliability graph and system redundancy
management rules to define this system, and explain how it differs from Fig. 3.8.
Section 3.7. Give a reference to SIFT, eg. Siewiorek & Swarz?
Section 3.7. Change of wording from "HARP developers are trying to implement a cold-
spare gate [1,2]." to "HARP developers have developed a new gate called a cold-spare
gate which should allow one to model unpowered system spares [1,2]. Unfortunately
there are presently problems in the implementation of this new gate [1] "
Below Fig. 3.12. If the results in the table have been checked and are correct, this is not
a very encouraging example of HARP's ability to deal with a practical problem. The
best agreement is three orders of magnitude to large, and the worst six orders of
magnitude!
Section 3.8. You should give reliability graph and system redundancy management rules
to define this system.
Section 3.8. Why were the results so good for this example but so poor for SIFT?
Section 3.10. Even if HARP has unacceptable limitations, isn't the instantaneous-jump
transformation (simplification) rule which was previously developed a useful technique
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49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
for use by a reliability analyst in simplifying a model or as an algorithm to be used in
some future fault-tolerant program?
Above Fig. 4.1. Define terms first coincident-fault failure, second coincident- fault
failure, etc.
Section 4.2 and Fig. 4.1. Won't you get the same result if you argue that in the Markov
model the state with the highest probability is S, the next highest probabilities are R 1 ....
Rn, lower still are C 1 .... Cn, etc. If AT is small than the probabilities decrease rapidly as
we go to the right in the Markov model, and states C 1 .... Cn, and higher order states can
be truncated with little loss in computational accuracy.
Above Section 4.4. The examples to be discussed have 25,000 and 100,000 states. It
seems to me that common sense, without any mathematics, would argue that it is
impossible to determine and input failure rates for any model so big unless it was some
sort of a repetitive or periodic structure, in which case states could be merged
(aggregated).
Above Section 4.4. How did you determine that the truncated model gave only a error
of .003. By running both the full model and the truncated model and comparing?
Explain.
Last sentence above Section 4.4. "use a aT of value 10" Do you mean 101 or 9. ?? HOW
did you determine this? by running the same example for smaller values of AT??
Section 4.4. "elementary methods would produce an accurate estimate of reliability."
What elementary methods? A Markov model solving package? (which one?) A program
such as Mathematica, Matlab, or Macsyma? A simple fault-tolerant solving program?
Section 5.2. Define what is meant by the term maximum-coverage-leakage.
Section 5.3. The definition of critical pair N-plex belongs in a Glossary of Terms and
also in some of the early introductory material.
Section 5.3. Define what is meant by the term higher level voting.
Section 6. Some experts on control theory should be asked to comment on the quoted
result from control theory which is used in the HARP bounds proof.
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MINOR COMMENTS
1. Pages need numbering.
2. Three lines below Fig. 2.1. Should the phrase read: .... from state S to state I followed
by ..." ? [Interchange states S and I ?].
3. There seems to be a typo in Fig. 2.4(a), the transition between states R 1 and S2 should be
_1(3_ + _)
4. Typo on line 8 of Section 2.8... the the .....
5. Above Fig. 3.4, second line. Word has should be as??
6. Below Fig. 3.9. "As shown in section 1.8" Where is section 1.8?
7. Section 3.8, lines 4 & 5. "Sections *****'??
8. Reference No. 1, "Langley TM-******" ??.
9. Also this report needs a formal cover page and TM number.
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C. 5 MODELING FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS WITH AN INSTANTANEOUS-JUMP
MODEL
One can show how the instantaneous-jump model works by making a Markov model for the
first 4 states SI, RI, $2, C1 of Fig. 2.3 and another Markov model for the first 3 states in Fig.
2.4(a), SI, S2, C I, and comparing the results.
The first Markov model is shown in Fig. 1 below:
l-a l-b-c 1
I R1
I
\1/b
I
I
s,
a= 4A
b= 5
c = 3,X
Fig. 1 Markov model for first 4 states of Fig. 2.3
The differential equations for the Markov model of Fig. 1 is given below:
i:'si = _ 4APsl
Pc1 = 3A Pcl
Ps2 = 5 Pc1
= 4),Ps1 - (3A + g) PR1
(l)
(2)
(3)
Psi(0 ) = I; PRI(0) ffi PCI(0) = PS2(0) = 0
A convenient way to solve equations (1) - (5) is to use Laplace transforms.
notation that the Laplace transform of f(t) is denoted by F(s) or {f(t)}*. The Laplace transforms
of Eqs. (I) - (5) become:
{Psi}*= I/(s+ 4)
{PR1}*= 4A/(s+ 4A)(s+ 3A + &)
{Pc1}* = 12A2/s(s+ 4A)(s+ 3A + 6)
(Ps2}* = 4A6/S(S + 4A)(s + 3A + 6)
(4)
(5)
Where we use the
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
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The simplest approach to solving the above transform equations is to expand the right hand
sides in partial fractions and identify each corresponding constant and exponential term. The
results are:
One
(10)
sides
Psx(t) = exp(=4gt) (10)
PRI(t ) ffi [4A/(6 = ),)]exp(=4)`t) =[4),/(6 = )`)]exp[-(3), + 8)]t (I1)
Pcl(t) = [3)`/(3)` + 6)] = [3)`/(6 - )`)]exp(-4)`t) + [12)`2/(3)` + 6)(6 = )`)exp[-(3,_ + 6)It (12)
Ps2(t) = [6/(3), + 5)] = [6/(5 - A)]exp(-4,_t) + [4),6/(3)` + 6)(6 = ),)exp[-(3A + 6)]t (13)
can check the validity of these results by summing the left and right hand sides of Eqs.
- (13). By definition, the sum of the 4 probabilities should be one, and the right hand
of the four equations sum to unity.
The second Markov model is shown in Fig. 2:
l-d - e 1
\ C'I
N
e \
\
\
d ffi [12)`2/(3)` + 6)1
e ffi [4)`6/(3)` + 6)1
Fig. 2 Markov model for first 3 states of Fig. 2.4 (b)
Our objective is to derive the probabilities S'1, C',, S'2 and show under what conditions these
values check with those of S1, C 1, S2. From the model of Fig. 2, the equations become:
Ps, 1 = -[(12)` 2 + 4)`5)1(3)` + 6)]Ps, 1
,
Pc, 1 = [(12)`2)/(3,\ + 5)] Pc, x
Ps, 2 = [4,_6/(3A + 6)]Pc, x
= - 4)`Ps, 1 (14)
(15)
(16)
Ps,l(O) = 1 Pc,x(O) = Ps,_.(O)= 0 (17)
Taking Laplace transforms yields
(Ps,1}* = I/(s + 4)`) (18)
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{Pc,_)* = [12_2/(3_+8)]/s(s + 4_) (19)
{Ps'2}* = [4_6/(3_+6)]/s(s + 4_) (20)
As previously, we expand the right hand sides of the above equations in partial fractions and
identify each corresponding constant and exponential term.
Ps, l(t) = exp(-4At)
Pc, x(t) = [3A/(3A + 6)] - [3A/(3A + 5)]exp(-4At)
Ps,2(t) ffi [6/(3A + 6)] - [6/(3A + 6)]exp(-gAt)
The results are:
(21)
(22)
(23)
Again, the validity check, summing the left and right hand sides of the above equations works.
Comparing the results, we see that the two models give equivalent results if the value of 6
>> 4A, since in this case the transient terms associated with the 6 time constants die out almost
instantly and leave the remainder of the solution.
TABLE 1
BASIC Program to Evaluate Equations (12) and (22)
LIST
10 REM Program to check White report below Fig. 2.4
20 REM Abreviations for greek letters: lambda = LL, delta = DD
30 REM EQUATION IS IN NOTES
I00 INPUT "Values of LL,DD,T";LL,DD,T
ll0 A = (3*LL)/(3*LL + DD)
120 B - ((3*LL)/(DD - LL))*(EXP(-4*LL*T))
122 Xl = 3*LL
124 X2 = (3*LL - DD)
126 X3 = (LL - DD)
128 X4 = EXP(-(3*LL + DD)*T)
130 C = ((XI)/(X2*X3))*(X4)
140 PRINT "A=";A, "B=";B, "C=";C
142 PRINT "XI,X2,X3,X4=";XI;X2;X3;X4
150 PRINT "PC=", (g - B -C)
160 PRINT "PC1 = " (A - B)
200 END
Ok
RUN
TABLE 2
Results of Running BASIC Program Given in Table 1
Values of LL,DD,T? 5E-4,1000,1
A= 1.499998E-06 B= 1.49700_E-06
XI,X2,X3,X4= .0015 -999.9985 -999.9995 0
PC= 2.99417E-09
PC1 = 2.99417E-09
Ok
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C.6 COMMENTS BY WHITE
Allen White responded briefly by E-mail to the comments by Shopman in Appendices C.4
and C.5. His comments are included here because they illustrate some of the intricacies of the
fault-tolerant modeling art and should be of interest to the analyst.
You recently read my "Review of the HARP Program: Approach and Mathematics" (White) and
asked for a reply to some of your comments and questions. I am trying a quick reply to some
of the comments.
For comment #8 on the accuracy of the instantaneous jump approximation, I get the same
equations that you present in Appendix C, but I think there is a type in line 160 of the BASIC
program.
For comment #26 on the importance of _overlapping faults'. Depending on the system and its
parameters, this category of faults can range from an insignificant contribution to system failure
to the dominant cause of system failure. Computing this probability of "overlapping faults" is
the major concern of several reliability estimation packages produced by NASA Langley.
For comments #47 and #48 on the usefulness of some of the HARP techniques and their
domain of application. Essentially, we already know this. The basic theory for the
conservativeness of instantaneous jumps, error bounds for instantaneous jumps, and what a
FEHM needs is contained in
A. L. White, Reliability Estimation for Reconfigurable Systems with Fast
Recovery. Journal Microelectronics and Reliability, Volume 26, No. 6,
pp.1111-1120, 1986.
We will attempt to publish extensions of this theory to address some of the questions and issues
raised by the HARP developers.
For comment #50 which gives a plausibility argument. It can be seen that, in general, systems
are capable of devious behavior. Try a system that has the reconfiguration sequence
majority-voting five-plex
majority-voting four-plex
majority-voting three-plex
simplex.
For most choices of parameters, the second coincident-fault failure state (for the four-plex) will
dominate the first coincident-fault failure state (for the five-plex) even though the second one
occurs later in the model. The reason is that the first coincident-fault failure needs three faults
present in the system while the second coincident-fault failure only needs two faults present in
the system.
For comment #51. I agree with this observation that the systems must have a lot of symmetric
structure or they will be impossible to handle. A local model generation program (ASSIST) is
designed to take advantage of the symmetry that is found in most large systems.
Comment #52 on the error bound of .003. This error bound is obtained from the theorem on
the dominance of the first coverage failure (compared to other coverage failures) for a certain
class of systems. This theorem along with another theorem (which I hope to publish soon) show
that reliability estimation is easy for a popular class of systems.
Sincerely,
Allan White
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APPENDIX D
SIGNIFICANCE OF MODELING ERRORS
Various factors which affect the correctness of HARP model solutions (and other modeling
programs) were discussed in Sec. 2.3. In this appendix we treat the problem of modeling errors
- "sins of omission and commission." By omission we mean that the model for some circuit or
system neglects one or more factors which are significant and result in a modeling error. Errors
of commission mean that an effect is identified as a factor in the model, however, it is included
in an incorrect manner which leads to a modeling error. Either of these errors may lead to an
optimistic or pessimistic reliability or availability prediction. Furthermore, the size of such an
error may be larger then any errors in the program algorithm, the code implementation, or
round-off errors in computation. Such modeling errors become "common mode" errors in that
they will be present regardless of the computational program which is to be employed.
As an illustration of an omission modeling error, consider the reliability analysis of a
parity bit coding circuit. (See Shopman 1990, pp. 566-569). This is a simple computation
which we can do analytically and obtain a closed form result. Such a checking circuit is used in
many fault-tolerant applications such as reading and writing from computer memory,
transferring data to and from a computer bus, and transmission of data between computers over
telephone lines. We will model the later application and consider it typical of the class of
application.
Let us consider the addition of a ninth parity bit to an g bit message byte. The parity bit
adjusts the number of l's in the word to an even (odd) number and is computed by a parity bit
generator circuit which calculates the exclusive or function of the 8 message bits. Similarly, an
exclusive or detecting circuit is used to check for errors. If there are one, three, five, seven, or
nine errors in the received word, the parity is violated, and the checking circuit will detect and
error. This can lead to several consequences such as "flagging" the error byte, retransmission of
the byte until no errors are detected, etc. The probability of interest is the probability of an
undetected error, Pue, which is the probability of two, four, six, or eight errors. These can be
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simply calculated using the binomial distribution and if we let q ffi the probability of an error
per transmitted bit then we obtain:
General B(r:9,q) = Irgl qr(l-q)9"r (D-l)
Two Errors B(2:9,q) = [_1 q2(l-q)9-2 (D-2)
Four Errors B(4:9,q) = [491 q'(l-q)9-' (D-3)
etc.
For q relatively small (10-4), it is easy to see that Eq. D-3 is much smaller than Eq. D-2, thus
only Eq. D-2 need be considered and the probability of an undetected error with parity bit
coding becomes
Pu.'= B(2:9,q) = 36q2(l-q) 7 (D-4)
We wish to compare this with the probability of an undetected error for an 8 bit transmission
without any checking which is given by
l-P (zero errors)= I-B( 0:8,q)= 1 - [_1 q°(l-q)s-°
= Pue = l - (l-q)8
The ratio of Eqs. D-5 and D-4 yields the improvement ratio due to the parity bit coding
Pue/Pue"= [! - (I-q)Sll[36q2(l_q)7]
(D-5)
(D-6)
For small q we can approximate Eq. D-6 by replacing (l-q) n by l-nq and [l/(l-q)] by 1 + q,
which yields
Pu,/P.,"= [2(I+ 7q)Igql (D-7)
The parameter q, the probability of failure per bit transmitted, is quoted as 10-4 in Hill and
Peterson 1981, was I0 -s or 10"e in the 1960's and 70's and now may be as low as 10 -7 for the
best lines. Equation D-7 is evaluated for this range of q values and the results appear in Table
D-I and in Fig. D-I.
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Table D-I Evaluation of Eq. D-6
_.q P,,./P,,."
I0-4 2.223 x IOs
I0-5 2.222 x 104
I0-e 2.222 x 105
I0-_ 2.222 x lO8
I0-s 2.222 x I0_'
108
0
s
b.
e_
107
106
105 [
104
103:1
10 8
bit error probability - q
Fig. D-I Improvement Ratio of Undetected Error Probability Due to Parity Bit Coding
In the above analysis we have assumed that the coder and decoder are perfect. We now
examine the validity of that assumption by modeling the reliability of the coder and decoder.
Assume that we are using a commercial device, the SN74180, a 9-bit odd/even parity
generator/checker, (See Texas Instruments 1988). We will use two such devices since the same
chip can be used as a coder and a decoder (generator/checker). The logic diagram of this
device is shown in Fig. D-2.
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oo0 (,,1 I
INPUT _ I
EVEN r'¢l J
INPUT
Fig. D-2 Logic Diagram for SN74180 (Texas Instruments, 1988)
A simple model for IC reliability is given in Shooman (1990), p. 641-644. The model gives the
failure rate per million hours as Ab = C(g) 1/2, where C was evaluated as 0.004 for 1985 IC
failure rate data. In Fig. D-2, there are four AND, one NOT and two NOR (note x'y' = (x +
y)') gates. Since the seven EXOR gates in Fig. D-2 use about 1.5 times as many transistors to
realize their function as a simple gate, we will consider them as equivalent to 10.5 gates. Thus
we have 17.5 equivalent gates and Ab = 0.004(17.5) 1/2 failures per million hours = 1.67 x 10 -s
failures per hour. Since we will be using one chip for coding and one for decoding, we must
double this rate, yielding 3.35 x 10"s failures per hour. Our previous computation was in terms
of failures per bit and this is in terms of failures per hour, thus, we will convert all terms to
failures per hour. The baud rate, B, of a transmission is essentially the number of bits per
second, and there are 3600 seconds per hour. An additional parameter is needed, namely D the
duty cycle, which is the fraction of time there are bit transmissions. The result is that we must
multiply probability of failure per bit by 3600BD to obtain failure rate per hour. For
infrequent events, the failure rate per hour multiplied by t = 1 hour gives the probability of
failure. Thus we obtain from Eqs. D-6
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Pue/Pue"=
simplifying,
Pue/Pu." =
{[I- (l-q)s]x 3600BD + [3.35x 10-s]}/
{[36q:_(l-q)7]x 3600BD + [3.35x 10-s]}
{[2.88 x 104BDq] + [3.35 x 10"s]} /
{[1.296 x 10SBDq _] + [3.35 x 10"s]}
(D-8)
(D-9)
Equation D-8 is evaluated for some typical numerical values in Table D-2. Note that at the
higher values of q, there is a significant difference between the values of the improvement ratio
and the results given in Table D-2 for perfect coders and decoders. Of course, the effects of
coder/decoder reliability will become negligible for high baud rates and duty cycles closer to
unity. The results given in Tables D-I and D-2 are compared in Fig. D-2.
Table D-2 Evaluation of Eq. D-8
Pue/Pue" Pue/Pue"
B= 1200 B= 1200
q D = 0.I D= 0.01
I0"4 2.223 x 10s 2.223 x 10s
10-5 2.222 x 104 2.222 x 104
I0-e 2.217 x 106 2.175 x 106
I0-_' 1.828x 106 7.046 x 105
I0"s 9.859 x 105 1.027x I05
D-6
10 8
10 7
i 106
105
103`
10 10 8
bit error probability - q
Fig. D-2 Improvement Ratio of Undetected Error Probability Due to Parity Bit Coding
x = Assumes perfect coder/decoder, Eq. D-6
* = Assumes the coder/decoder can fail, Eq. D-8 (Baud Rate = 1200, Duty Cycle = 0.01)
Clearly, for certain values of the parameters, the effect of neglecting the coder/decoder
reliability is much greater than the differences one might encounter due to errors caused by the
modeling program itself.
Consider a second example. Suppose that we have a system of two elements in parallel
with a third element as a spare. Assume no repair and that the failure of either of the first two
elements is immediately sensed and the spare element is switched in. The question now arises
whether the spare element is a "hot" or "cold" standby, i.e.. whether it is powered up in standby
and can fail or whether it is not powered while a standby and can not fail until it is powered
up to replace one of the original two units. We will solve the resulting Markov models for both
situations and compare the results.
The Markov model for two parallel elements with a hot spare is shown in Fig. D-3, and
that for a two elements plus a cold spare is given in Fig. D-4.
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1-3_. 1-2_. 1 -_. 1
So=XlX2X3 SI=Xl 'X2.X3 + S2=XlX,?.'X3' + S3=X1'X2'X3 '
XlX2'X3 + Xl'X2X3' +
XlX2X3' Xl 'X,?.'X3
Fig. D-3 Markov Model for Two Elements With a Hot Spare
1-2_. 1-2_. 1-_. 1
So=XlX2X3 SI=Xl'X2X3 + S2=XlX2.'X3' + S3=X1'X2'X3'
XlX2'X3 + Xl 'X2X3' +
Xl X2X3' Xl 'X2'X3
Fig. D-4 Markov Model for Two Elements With a Cold Spare
Since there is no repair coupling the states, the state probabilities can be solved independently
in order from left to right in the diagram. The equations for the first two states, which we will
need to compute the availability, are given below for each model:
Hot Spares
Pso = - 3APse (D=I0)
Psl= 3APse + 2APsx (D-I I)
Cold Spares
PSo = - 2APso (D-12)
Psl= 2APso + 2APsl (D=I3)
D-8
Psx = 2APso + 2APsl (D-13)
If we assume that the system is placed in use at t=0 with all 3 items working, then the initial
conditions are Pso = 1, Psi = 0. Using Laplace transforms or conventional differential equation
theory to solve Eqs. D-10 to D-13 yields for the state probabilities and the availability, A(t):
Hot Spares
ps ° = e-SXt (D-14)
ps i = 3(e-2Xt _ e-SXt) (D-15)
Ah(t) = Pso + Psi = 3e -2at - 2e -sxt) (D-16)
Cold Spares
PSo = e-2Xt (D-17)
Psi = (I + 2At)e "sat) (D-18)
Ac(t) = PSo + Psi ffi (3 - 2e-'_t)e "_'_t)
In Table D-3 we compare Eqs. D-16 and D-17 for a few values of At.
(D-19)
At Ac Ah A_q./Ah
0 l 1 l
0.5 0.736 0.657 1.12
1 0.404 0.306 1.32
2 0.09 ! 0.05 1.83
As we can see by the ratio of the two availabilities there are significant differences in these two
solutions. Thus, a mistake in the modeling phase which confuses one model with another will
make a considerable difference which may be much greater than the differences one might
encounter due to errors caused by the modeling program itself.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The control and safety systems for power generating stations have traditionally been
designed using relay logic and analog electronic components. With the advent of the digital
electronics revolution, we are now able to build controllers with great power and flexibility of
modest cost out of a handful of microprocessor and memory chips. A host of new and
challenging problems accompany the introduction of digital controllers for power generating
stations [Lauber, 1980]
1.1 Digital Controllers
Because of the stringent safety and reliability requirements digital controllers use several
levels of redundancy (as do the earlier analog systems). However, the flexibility and power of
digital computation give us several ways in which to realize redundancy. The term fault-
tolerant computing is generally used to describe the various techniques which are employed to
implement redundancy in digital systems.
1.2 Fault-Tolerant Systems
The term fault-tolerant systems was probably coined in the 1960's in conjunction with
long duration space missions, where some redundant elements could fail (develop faults) but the
other elements would take over and the overall space craft would be tolerant to (some number
of) faults. Today the term is used to describe a wide variety of techniques:
1. Coding techniques involving extra check bits (redundant) to detect and correct
transmission errors on busses, lines,memory units, etc.
2. Majority voting schemes (N-modular redundancy), compare the outputs of redundant
units.
3. Parallel redundancy (or majority voting) combined with spares and the possibility of
repair/replacement.
4. Recovery from transient hardware or software faults.
This paper will focus on the use of majority voting to enhance the reliability of the
control system for electric power generation. The models of the hardware are well known
[Siewiorek 1982 and Shopman 1990], however, we must also consider how to model the
reliability of the software in a majority voting configuration, [Shopman 1983]. This paper will
focus on the modeling of the software reliability in a majority voting scheme. ."
1.3 N-Modular Redundant Hardware
The simplest voting scheme, n-modular redundancy scheme, is where n = 3 and is called
triple modular redundancy or simply, TMR. One of the advantages of TRM is that no special
technique is required to implement redundancy. The logic of the voter is simple and easy to
build, and a block diagram of a TMR configuration is shown in Fig. 1.
The system succeeds if two or more of the circuits succeed. If we assume that the voter
does not fail, then the reliability is given by
R = P(AB + AC + BC) (l)
If all the digital circuits are independent and identical with probability of success p, then this
equation can be rewritten in terms of the binomial theorem, where B(3:3) and B(2:3) mean that
3 out of 3 and 2 out of 3 circuits succeed.
R = B(3:3) + B(2:3)
(2)
=3p2- 2p3= p)(3-2p) (3)
This is, of course,the reliability expression for a two=out=of=three system.
If a single circuit has a reliability p=0.95, then substitution in Eq. (3) shows that R for the
TMR system increases to 0.993, a 700% reduction in the probability of failure.
Of course in deriving Eq. (3) we have assumed that the voter does not fail. If we include
the reliability of the voter, Pv, then Eq. (3) becomes
R = pvp_(3=2p) (4)
Clearly, the voter must have a high reliability, otherwise it can negate most or all of the gains
due to the TMR scheme. Using the numerical values given above, if the voter reliability is
0.98, then Eq. (4) yields a system reliability of 0.973 and the probability of failure improvement
ratio drops from a factor of 7 to a factor of 1.86. Clearly, these results which were derived for
TMR in Eqs. (1-4) extend to N-Modular redundancy. Because of cost, TMR is the most
popular version. In more advanced implementations one can vote at a lower (subcircuit) level,
incorporate redundant voters by using a voter at the output of each subcircuit, and achieve a
higher reliability at the cost of increased hardware. [Siewiorek 1982 and Shopman 1990].
2.0 SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
The analysis of the TMR system in the preceding section excluded the effects of software
failure. There are always some residual errors in software which are not found because
exhaustive testing is impossible. As the software is subject to a wide variety of inputs during
operation, some of these errors are excited, and the system fails. The rate at which such
software caused errors occur is called the software failure rate. Various software reliability
models have appeared in the literature, [Shopman 1983, and Musa 1987], which lead to a model
for the reliability of the software, P=w.
If the system can fail due to the hardware as well as due to the software, and these
failures are independent, then the simplest TMR model which includes the effect of software is
to introduce a multiplicative term into Eq. (4).
R = p,wpvp2(3-2p) (5)
Thus, both the voter reliability and the software reliability appear as series terms, and both
lower the potential improvement which TMR can provide. If we use the same numerical values
as previously, and include a software reliability of 0.99 in Eq. (4), then we obtain a system
reliability of 0.963. At this point we might just as well use a single system with a hardware
reliability of 0.95 and a software reliability of 0.99 yielding a system reliability of 0.94 since the
failure improvement ratio (.06/.037) is only 1.62.
The initial approach to dealing with the software reliability problem is to try and develop
the best possible software, and make it nearly error free so that P=w approaches unity and can
thus be neglected in Eq. (5). This involves using all the techniques of high quality software
development which have evolved over he past 20 years:
- Formal specifications
= Design reviews
= Controlled design
- Top-down
- Two stage
= 2 -
* rapid prototype
* final top-down
- Modular design
- Structured programming
Formal module testing
- Integration testing
- Software reliability modeling
- Simulation testing
Despite such strenuous efforts, the software reliability is seldom so high as to be insignificant,
and system designers began to consider he possibility of making the software redundant using
the technique of N-Version Programming which is discussed in the next section. (Some authors
call this software diversity.)
3.0 RELIABILITY OF N-VERSION SOFTWARE
For many years fault-tolerant designers have thought of using more than one independent
version of a program to provide software redundancy, Chen and Avizienis [1978] chose the
name "N-Version Programming" to refer to the use of multiple independent versions of
software. If we assume that the hardware and software are independent, that we are using
TMR, and that we have three independent versions of the software, (even though this is costly),
then the system reliability model is as shown in Fig. 2. "The reliability expression for Fig. 2
becomes
where Ph =
and p,w ffi
R = pv(phP.w)2(3 = 2PhP.w)
reliability of the hardware
reliability of the software.
(6)
Using our previous numerical values, Ph = 0.95, Ptw ffi 0.99, and increasing the voter reliability
to 0.99, we obtain after substitution in Eq. (6): R = 0.98. This represents an improvement
factor of 2.5. Clearly, the voter reliability must be increased, either by designing a high
reliability voter or by voting at a lower level. If the voter reliability is made to approach unity,
then the last computation predicts a reliability value of R = 0.989, and the improvement factor
becomes about 5. Thus, the use of TMR hardware and software has been very effective in
improving reliability.
There is also another factor which is more difficult to deal with, the effect of common
mode software failures.
4.0 EFFECT OF COMMON MODE FAILURES
In the past analysts have found that at times hardware redundancy schemes are
compromised by common mode failures. There can be similar problems with software, and in
the past n-version programming has been subject to the following common mode failures:
1. Wrong or incomplete requirements.
2. Identical or equivalent misinterpretation of the requirements.
3. Identical or equivalent incorrect treatment of boundary problems.
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4. Identical or equivalent incorrect designs for difficult portions of the problem.
This section models and evaluates the effect of software common mode failures.
If we assume that there are two different ways in which common mode dependencies
exist, requirements and program, then we can model a TMR system as shown in Fig. 3, where
Psw
PC_r
Pcms
= 1 - probability of an independent mode software fault
= 1 - probability of a common mode requirements error
= 1 - probability of a common mode software fault
The reliability expression for the model given in Fig. 3 is given by:
R = PcmrPcmsIPs.2(3-2p.w)] (7)
We can evaluate the effect of software common modes by studying Eq. (7). In the next
section, we will substitute numerical values and evaluate the effect of common mode failures.
However, inspection of Eq. (7) suggests the calculation of a simple bound on the common mode
probabilities. If we observe that the effect of the common mode probabilities is to decrease the
reliability, we can bound the common mode probability by setting R = p, the reliability of a
single unit.
We set
Pc = PcmrPcms (8)
and substitute in Eq. (7)
R = pc[psw2(3-2psw)]
Now we setR = p.,,
p.,,= pc[p.,,2(3-2p.w)]
I = Pc[3P.,,-2p.,,2] (9)
3 I
ps,2 ___ ps,,+%Pcz= 0 (I0)
Solving the above quadratic equation for the larger root yields
3/2"_/(9/4)-(4/2pc) 3 1 [9 2 (11)
P"" 2
The smallest value of Pc which satisfies Eq. (i I) is that which drives the_radical to zero. The
radial cannot be negative since, P,, is a probability and can not have an imaginary part.
9 2
4 Pc
8
Pc >---_ (12)
Eq. (12) is a well known result, since the function (form of Eq. (7)) is the same as Eq. (4) and
the same minimum holds for the reliability of a voter [see Shooman 1990, Table 6.7].
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5.0 NUMERICAL DATA FOR COMMON MODE ERRORS
In order to Evaluate Eq. (6) we must have some typical data values for Pc. Unfortunately,
experiments to determine Pc are difficult to set up and costly to run. Two sets of data will be
discussed below, that by Chert and Avizienis [1978] and by Knight and Leveson [1986].
The data gathered by Chen and Avizienis [1978] is reported in Pradhan, [1972, p. 665].
Seven versions of an algorithm for solving a partial differential equation for temperature over a
two-dimensional region were used. Twelve three-version sets were constructed, and each set
was subjected to 32 test cases, yielding a total of 384 tests. The results are shown in Table 1.
Inspection of Table 1 shows that 91% of the test cases resulted in zero or one failure of
the three versions of the program, and thus the reliability was given by R = 0.91. Assuming no
common mode, Eq. (3) holds for the 3-version software, and we can solve the quadratic
equation for the value of individual program reliability. Another approach is to solve the
equation by simple interpolation as is done in Table 2. The resulting value is p = 0.815.
Clearly, using TMR to raise the reliability of a single set of software from a reliability of
0.815 to a system reliability of 0.91 is not a very attractive design. The decrease in 1 - R was
from .185 to .09, a factor of 2. The problem is that the basic software is not reliable enough.
Consider a second set of data discussed below.
Consider a second set of data gathered by Knight and Leveson 1986:27 different versions
of a program were subjected to 200 acceptance tests and once these versions were accepted,
each program was run 1 million times and compared with a standard program (the "gold"
program) which had received several million tests and had been subjected to extensive
structured walkthroughs. The data from the Knight and Leveson experiment is summarized in
Tables 3 and 4.
Assume that we will use three independent programs which have the worst reliability, No.
22 in Table 3, where we assume that for each program version
PcPlw = PcmrPcrmPsw= 0.990344 (13)
If there were no dependency, then Pc ffi 1, and substituting the value of Psw in Eq. (7) would
yield a TMR reliability of 0.99972. The improvement in 1 - R would be from .0097 to .00028,
or a factor of 34.6.
Since we have decided to use the data for Version No. 22 given in Table 3, we now need
the data for common mode failures associated with Version No. 22. Unfortunately, this data is
not reported in the paper, however, in Table 4 we see the summary data for common failures
among all the programs. There were 1255 occurrences of common mode failures among all the
different programs in the group of 27 which were each tested 1,000,000 times. Thus, an upper
bound on the common mode failure probability can be obtained from the ratio 1255/27,000,000
= 0.000046, and the probability of no common mode failure, Pc = 0.999954. Using the value
given in Eq. (12), we can solve for P_w = 0.990344/0.999954 ffi 0.99039. Substituting these
values in Eq. (7) yields:
R - 0.999954[0.990392(3 - 2x0.99039)] = 0.99968
The value of 1 - R becomes 0.00032 and the improvement factor is reduced to 30.2. This is a
minor reduction, (also remember that we have used an upper bound on the common mode
probability), and the effect of common mode failures in the ease is not significant.
We repeat our above calculation for another set of data. Consider case No. 14 of Table 3
where the program reliability is higher.
PcPlw = 0.99862
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If there were no dependency, pc ffi 1 and substituting the value of P.w in Eq. (7) would yield a
TMR reliability of 0.99999433. The improvement in I-R would be from 0.001386 to 0.0000057,
or a factor of 243. We use the same estimate for common mode probability as previously, Pc =
0.999954. Using the above value for Pc and PcPaw we can solve for P,w:
Psw ffi0.99862/0.999954 = 0.99867.
Substituting these values into Eq. (7) yields:
R ffi0.999954[0.998672(3 - 2x0.99867)]= 0.999945
The valueof I - R becomes 0.00005533 and the improvement factorisreduced to 25. This isa
significantreductionin thiscase,however, thereisstilla largeimprovement due to TMR.
Clearly, it is important to study further the data from the Knight and Levison experiment,
and the Chen and Avizienisdata as well as any other availabledata to betterdetermine the
relevantprobabilities.
6.0 ACHIEVING INDEPENDENT SOFTWARE VERSIONS
There are impediments to achieving independent software versions:
1. Cost
2. Insuringindependence of the versions
3. Synchronization of different versions
The following procedures have been suggested as guidelines in developing independent software
versions:
1. All programmers work from the same requirements.
2. Each programmer or programming group works independently
communication among the various groups is not permitted.
of the others and
3. Each version of the software is subjected to the same comprehensive acceptance test.
. Specification languages can be used to write two or more sets of equivalent
specifications, the formal specifications can be analyzed and verified, and these can be
used as separate independent problem specifications. This tends to reduce the probability
of specification common mode failures.
In running large scale tests on software, we can take advantage of some features of TMR. Since
we will be producing at least 3 versions of the software, using TMR, we can run a large scale
test by comparing the outputs of the three programs. This is cheaper than an ordinary test
since we are relieved of the cost of computing the correct output for each test case, because
agreement of 3 outputs is deemed correct operation. Disagreement of two or three of the
systems must be analyzed, and the number of identical wrong outputs can be statistically
analyzed to yield an estimate of the common mode probability.
For a discussion of the problems in synchronizing the inputs and outputs of N versions
and the problems in comparing the outputs of different versions due to roundoff error see
Brilliant 1987.
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7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
N-version programming has been appliedor proposed in a number of applications:
I. The flight control software for space shuttle has a primary system with 4 computers, a
voter and, a primary software system. The backup system has a fifth computer running
a second independent software version, written in a different language, by a separate
contractor.
2. The slat and flap control system of the 310 airbus industry aircraft has redundant
software.
3. The point switching, signal control, and traffic control in the Gothenberg area of the
Swedish state railways uses redundant software.
4. Several authors have proposed the use of redundant software for nuclear reactor safety
systems.
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TABLE 1
EXPERIMENT IN THREE-VERSION PROGRAMMING**
Number of
faulty
versions in
the set
Number of
tests
Correct executions of the set
Number Percent*
0 290 290 76
l 71 59 15
2 18
3 5
384
0 0
0 0
349 91
Incorrect executions of the
set
Number Percent*
0 0
12 3
18 5
35
* Percentage of the total cases
**From Chen 1978
TABLE 2
SOLUTION OF EQ. (3) FOR p BY
INTERPOLATION GIVEN THAT R-0.91
p R=p2(3-2p)
1 1
0.9 0.972
0.8 0.896
0.85 0.939
0.82 0.914
0.818 0.912
0.816 0.911
Solution p=0.815 0.910
0.814 0.909
-8-
TABLE 3
VERSION FAILURE DATA, NUMBER OF FAILURES IN 1,000,000 TESTS [KNIGHT 1986]
Version Failures
1 2
2 0
3 2297
4 0
5 0
6 1149
7 71
8 323
9 53
10 0
11 554
12 427
13 4
14 1368
Pr(Success)
0.999998
Version
15
Failures [ Pr(Success)
1.000000 16 62
0.997703 17 269
1.000000 18 115
1.000000
0.998851
0.999929
0.999677
0.999947
1.000000
19
20
21
22
23
24
250.999446
0.999573 26
0.999996 27
0.998632
264
1.000000
0.999938
0.999731
0.999885
0.999736
260
936 0.999064
92 0.999908
9656 0.990344
80 0.999920
0.999740
97 0.999903
883 0.999117
0 1.000000
TABLE 4
OCCURRENCES OF MULTIPLE
FAILURES IN 1,000,000 TESTS
Number
[KNIGHT 1986]
Probability
0.000551002
3 0.00034300 343
4 0.00024200 242
5 0.00007300 73
6 0.00003200 32
7 0.00001200 12
• 8 0.00000200 2
I Occurrences
551
TOTAL 1255
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Fig. 3 Model of TMR Software (3-Version Programming) Including Common
Mode Software Faults
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Abstract
Markov models are frequently used to analyze
the reliability and availability of complex systems.
For example, modern fault=tolerant computer systems
can lead to hundreds or thousands of system states.
Even if a computer program is used, simplification
leads to reduced solution time, greater insight, and
sometimes checks oa the validity of the solution.
In a 1987 paper, the authors introduced criteria
for merlpin8 states in Markov model to reduce the
complexity. Also, : method was involved for
decomposing suitable processes into two or more
subprocesses which are more easily solved. This
papers develops simple expressions for upper and
lower bounds on the Markov state probabilities
obtained from inspection of the terms in the Markov
probability matrix. These bounds can be used for
quick paper, pencil, and calculator estimates. The
bounds are also combined with the merging and
decomposition methods in several examples. Use of
these bounds can aid the well known simplification
technique of truncation (deleting the low probability
states), by quickly obtaininl_ upper bounds on the
state probabilities which snsures that only low
probability states Me truncated.
Introduction
Problem Complexity
The standard technique for studying the
availability of a repairable system is to begin by
formulating a Markov probability model for the
system. (Shopman. 1989). The solution of a Markov
model for a system of n elements (with two states
8pod and bad) involves m system states where
mS2 =. The term element applies to
components, subsystems, replaceable units, modules,
etc. The probabilities of being in a particular state
at some time t are computed by formulating and
solving a system of m coupled first order differential
equations. The system availability, A, is then
computed by summing the probabilities, (all Markov
model states are mutually exclusive), for the subset
of states where the system is UP.
Most modern systems are digital in nature,
extremely complex, and often distributed and
fault-tolerant. (Shopman 1989, Shopman and Laemmel
1987). In addition the hardware and software are
coupled, which contributes additional complexity, and
the system reliability is modeled by a many-state
Marlmv model. If the system is repairable, additional
states must be added to characterize realistically the
logistics aspects of repair, includin 8 the number of
avxilablespLres and the effect of shared repairmen.
At present, the approach to solving such large
and complex Markov models is to use one or more of
the available computer modelin8 programs. Many of
these programs have been developed by NASA to
model fault-tolerant computing systems, (Bavuso 1984,
N8 1977, Trivedi 19_). Such programs are quite
effective; however, design insight is often lacking
due to the complexity of the problem, Thus. a large
number of computer runs are needed to establish
sensitivities, as to how the various parameters affect
the solution.
In most cases of Markov availability modeling, it
is desirable to have simplifying analytical techniques.
These can be used for initial studies to provide
solution checks, design insight, and to reduce the
number of computer runs, or to reduce the solution
time for each run.
Several methods for simplifying such problems
will be discussed and compared. These are:
I. State merging
2. Process decomposition
3. The use of upper and lower bounds
4. Approximations based on combinations of these
met hods
Our 1987 paper focused on the first and second
techniques (see Shopman and Laemmel 1987), whereas
this paper concentrates on the third and fourth
methods and applies these techniques to examples of
a fault-tolerant computing system (Siewiorek 1982)
and a local area communications network (Bateman
1989).
Solution Complexity
Any sizeable problem will eventually utilize a
computer for solution, :hus modeling simplification
techniques may be view,:d as a preliminary step in
the modeling and soluti)n process. For a medium
sized problem, a prior complexity reduction often
allows one to perfoz m a pencil, paper, and
calculation solution. If the initial problem is large,
the solution must even, ually be done by computer;
however, complexity reduction can reduce the
solution time by a considerable amount, in the
remainder of this section, we study the limiting
complexity of computer solutions.
There is another benefit to complexity reduction.
One can generally synthesize a large hypothetical
problem which can be collapsed to a simple closed
form analytical solution. Such an example can be
used to test the validity of accuracy of a reliability
modeling program by "feeding" the computer the
large scale problem to solve, and comparing the
results with the closed form analytical solution.
Clearly, large reliability modeling programs are
subject to the same types of residual "bugs" which
all software experiences and it is difficult to invent
large comprehensive test programs.
A Markov model results in a system of first
order differential equations. If the analyst is
interested in the time solution for the state
probabilities, this system of equations must be solved
numerically. We can analyze the order of complexity
of such a solution by considering a simple standard
solution technique. Consider the following set of
first orde_r differential equations which represent the
Markov equations of an m state Markov model
I_1(t) -AtlP| (t) +AI2Ps (t) +'.-AlmPm (t)
_S (t) =AZlDt(t) +Asspz (t) +...ASmPm (t)
_(t) -A._p_(t) + A.sPz(t) +... A..Pm(t) (l)
where
15i(t) - the first derivative of pi(t)
pl(t) - the probability of being in state
i at time t
Ati = a coefficient which is the
transition rate into state i
from state j, for i # j. Ati
is defined to make column sums
zero
0].49 144X19010000.0254501 (X) ,: l_)gl) IEEE
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Consider that we will use the simple Euler
approximation to change the system of differential
equations into difference equations
dp I pl(t+At) -pit t)
-c]T =s At (2)
Substitution of Eq. (2) into Eq. (I) yields
,+at)-a,[< %(,),A zp,It)• 1Pz(
Pz(t+At)-'S, [ A, zPI(t)+(As,+_t) P,< t)+'"A,mPm(')]
t. t)-'st[ 0J, ]
We begin the solution for the system of equations
[Eq. (3)] at time t-0 by substituting the initial state
probabilities (initial conditions) into the first
equation (ps) of Eq. (3). This requires m
substitution operations, m additions, and m
multiplications in the Pi equation, or we can lump
the various arithmetic step times and just say m
operations. Now since we must repeat this task m
times (for each of the equations), we have m s
operations. Of course this is just to compute the
new state probabilities at t=At. We must repeat
this for 2At, 3"st, etc. Assume that we know the
natural frequencies (eigenvalues) of the system of
equations given in Eq. (I). If we let rmLx
be the time constant associated with the lowest
natural frequency (real part only if any are complex
conjugate pairs), then we can say that the
computation must continue until t=Srm= x. At
this time the corresponding exponential term in the
solution is reduced to e "s which is less than
I% of its-initial value. Thus, we will need to repeat
the computation -srmaaz/'st times. The choice
of At is often a complex problem in numerical
analysis, however, if we know the minimum time
constant in the solution, rmin, we can
approximate At by rmin/ 100. Thus, an
approximate expression for the number of operations
to solve Eq, (I) is given by
'50Orris) m= (4)
fmin
In many cases, the analyst requires only the steady
stile values of the probabilities, i,e. pit t) as
t--.oo, which we denote by p.. To solve for the
steady state values, all the at=me derivatives on the
left hand side of Eq. (1) are set to zero. and any
one of the m equations is deleted to cure the fact
that the m equations are dependent. Then to replace
the deleted equation we use
] = Pl + PZ + " ' "Pm (.5)
which yields a nonsingular set of m algebraic
equations, We can compute the solution complexity
of the m equations if we consider the Gaussian
elimination method (String 1980). To perform
Gaussian elimination we take the first and second
equations, multiply equation two by
AtZ/ ASS and subtract the modified
second equation from the first to obtain a zero
insP*ad of Asr This requires m operations
and is repeated (m-I) times, i.e., for all equations
but the first, resulting re(m-I) operations. The
elimination procedure has to be repeated for each of
the m variables, skipping the columns which have
been made zero until a triangular matrix is obtained.
This results in I/3m(mZ-I) operations, and the
overall order is approximately mS/3. Comparing
this with Eq. (4) we see that the time solution
requires more steps than the steady state solution if
(-500 rmu/fmin)>m, which will often be the case.
In the future, we hope to analyze the order of
complexity of some of the popular Markov model
solving programs. (CARE Ill, Bauro 1984; ARIES, NJ
1977. HARP, Trivedi: 1986, etc.)
Previous Work
Merging
Our 1987 paper reports a set of rules which can
be used to determine under what conditions the
states in a Markov model can be combined (merged)
to reduce the model complexity (Shooman and
Laemmel 1987). As an example of the large
reduction in complexity which can sometimes be
obtained, we refer to the 189-state Markov model of
a local area network given in Bateman (1989). The
original model was solved using a computer program.
We have reduced the Igg-state model to an
equivalent two-state model (all components UP,
versus one or more components completely or
partially DOWN) by applying the merger conditions,
although not all state transitions satisfied are
criteria. Simple analysis with pencil and paper and a
pocket calculator yielded virtually the same
probability as the computer program for the UP state
probability. Of course solution for some of the
other state probabilities would require further
analysis; however, this result does provide some
insight and an independent check on the computer
program results. Our analytical techniques should also
yield approximate solutions to more sophisticated
figures of merit for the communications system such
as expected channel capacity. (A weighted sum of
the various failure mode probabilities and the
reduced channel capacity of each partial failure
mode, )
Process Decomposition
Process decomposition was discussed in our 1987
paper and involves decomposing the Markov model in
question into two or more simpler models. The
simpler models are solved and the state probabilities
of the original model are obtained by a product of
the decomposed model probabilities. Example I is
discussed to illustrate this means of simplification.
It is a decomposable four-state Markov model Is
shown in Fig. I.
I
.54 .06
_'x I .54 /'3 .6
' I_'_ _ /'h/'n_T/"04 _l_'-'_ "4
,Vo.o
.72 "" .8
°1 '
• °1
A+C B+D
Fig. I - Example I, a four-state Markov model which
can be decomposed into two-state models. (Shooman
and Laemmel, Volume IV, p. 6).
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The original model has 4 states A,B,C,D which can
be decomposed into two components (sub-Markov
mOdels) x t and r s. As shown in the figure,
the sub-model ft has two states which are
related to the states in the original model by (A or
C), (B or D). Similarly for sub model x=, the
two states are (A or B), (C or D). Assume that all
the transition probabilities in this example can be
viewed as ruAt - PtJ ( transition rate times time
interval), and the time interval can be assumed to be
unity. We now solve the two sub-Marker models.
These two models were solved using a computer
program. The results for the steady state values
are:
P(A+C) - 0.9
P(B+D) - 0l (6)
The probabilities of being in the four states of the
original model are:
P(A) - P(A+C) x P(A+B) - 0.9 x 0.333 - 0.300
P(B) - P(B÷D) x P(A÷B) - 0. I x 0.333 - 0.0333
P(C) - P(A+C) x P(C+D) = 0.9 x 0.667 = 0.600
P(D) = P(B+D) x P(C+D) = 0.1 x 0.667 = 0.0667 (8)
A separate solution of the four-state Marker model
verifies the numerical results given in Eq. 8.
Upper and Lower Bounds
A search of the literature has revealed few
bounds for the values of the steady state Marker
model probabilities (eisenvector components for the
stationary probabilities in a Marker process). (See
White 1989, Butler 1988, Seneta 1981.) We discuss
several bounds on the steady state Markov
probabilities, Pi' for the i'th system state. The
following derivations will utilize matrix notations for
the Marlmv processes.
A Marker process can be described either by a
raze matrix _A_, (note the under bar used to denote a
matrix). The expanded form of the equations is
given in Eq. (1) or more compactly by
_i(t) - _. A_ipj(t) (9)
j=l
and in matrix form this becomes
_(t) - Ap(t) (,o)
Note that the left hand side of Eq. (10) is a rate
(per unit time), thus, _A must also be composed of
rates. Another way to formulate a Markov model is
in terms of a probability matrix _P. The expanded
form for such a formulation is
pitt) - Pttpt (t) ÷ PuPa(t) + • • • PtmPm(t)
Pitt) - PstPz(t) + PszPs(t) + • . . PzmPm(t)
Pro(t) " PmtPt(t) + PmsPs(t) + • • • PmmPm(t ) (11)
and the alternate forms of Eq. (II) are
_m
Pt( t+_t) " j=z_: PiiP/t) (12)=
p(t÷&t) ,- P_p(t) (13)
The relation between the two matrices P_ and A__is
_P- exp(aSiA_..) (14)
If At is very small, we can write
P =, I + At _A (15)
We can denote the steady state value of p by Poe"
In the steady state, we can also write that
Poo=Ppoo which substituted into Eq. (12) leads
tO;
p=- _=- _&tA_p® (t6)
and in the steady state I_-0 which forces
_. Atip j to be zero (see Eq. (9)).j=l
A more detailed derivation shows that Eq. (16) is
exact rather than approximate. We can now use the
above notation in our derivation of the bound
equations.
Since Pij is the probability of the system
rein 8 to state i from state j, then we can write t
t_=mtPij= I 0 _ Pij < l (17)
From Eq. (12) we can write an expression for the
steady sta_e where pi(t) is not changing
Pi = j:_'l PijPj (18)
where
t=_ Pt " I 0 < pt < I (19)
and (]8) can be rearranged yielding
(I-PLi) Pi " j;iPiJPj (20)
We can now develop bounds on the state
probabilities. Pt' based on Eq. (20).
Define m i and M i as the minimum and maximum
values, respectively, of Ptj with j varying over
all values except i. That is, m i and M t are the
nunimum and maximum off-dia_ona] values of the ith
row of matrix Pij" A]] the p. are non-
negative, since they are probabilities, tl'hus, we can
bound each of the Pij terms on the right hand
side of Eq. (20) by M_ from above and m I from
below yielding
mt _ Pj -< _ Pij Pj -< _ _ Pj (21)
Substituting the left hand side of Eq. (20) for the
center term of Eq. (21) yields
mi E Pj -< (I-Pii)pt -< ]vii E Pj (22)
J_ J_
Using Eq. (19), the left and right hand terms in Eq.
(22) can be written as
mr( I-p i) _ ( l-Pti)P t _ IVy( I-Pi ) (23)
We can solve for a lower bound on Pl from the
left and center terms in Eq. (23) by solvin 8 the
inequality for Pi yielding
mi - miP t < Pi(I-Pu) (24)
Since (I-Pit) + m t is positive, solving for
Pi results in the lower bound
mi
< p, (25)
Similarly, using the right and center terms in Eq.
(23) gives an upper bound
awe avoid the trivial cases where some Pij is unity.
256 1990 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY Symposium
MI ( 26 )
Pj-<_
Unless a transition is possible to state i from
every other state, Eq. (25) gives zero as the lower
bound for, PI' the probability of being in state i.
Since a lower bound of zero is of little help, we
seek a closer bound. Let state k be some state from
which a transition to state i is possible. Then from
Eq.20, since all terms are nonTnegative, we can write
that the single term is < to the summation
Pi)t Pk -< ( I'P_i)Pi
Now use Eq, 25 to obtain a lower bound on Pk
yielding
P|kmk < ( I- P_) Pl (27)
which gives
Ptkm_ < k _ti (2g)
(l'PJl)(l°P_+mk) - Pi
Of course, this new 16wer bound might well be 0 if
is also O, no matter which k is chosen.
m_A somewhat more involved variation on the above
methods will always yield a non-zero lower bound for
a state which actually has a non-zero probability.
The process can be most easily explained by
reference to a particular example described in the
form of a state diagram.
Fig. 2 - Example 2, a five-state Markov model.
Suppose m lower bound on Ps is desired. There is
no path from 5 to 2, so that P4 does not appear
in the expression for Pz' thus using Eq. 18 we
obtain
Pz " aPz + dPz + bPs 4. cp4 (29)
rearranging terms yields
(I-d)p, - ap z + Up s + cp 4 _ (30)
We wish to manipulate Eq. 30 into a form where all
the Pl terms appear. We observe that p4 does
depend on Ps' and an expression for P4 can be
substituted in Eq. (30).
P, - ep s ÷ 813t ÷ fP_
(I-d)p s - ap I ÷ bpa 4. c(ep s 4. 8P4 + fps)
(I-d-ce)p s ,. ap z + bp s + cap 4 + cfp 4 (31)
Let r be the minimum of the coefficients a,b,cg,cf.
Then
(I-d-¢e)p I > r(pl+p s 4. p¢ + ps) = r(I-ps)
and solving for Pz yields a nonzero lower bound
r < p: (32)l-d-ce+r -
Note that the term in parentheses in Eq. 31 is
positive since the right hand side is positive, hence
the division of an inequality is again legitimate. The
method just described can be appJied to any state
which can be reached from every other state, and
the tree of paths showing these transitions can be
used as a guide in arriving at an equation such as
Eq. 31. For the example of Fig. 2, the tree is
shown in Fie 3.
Fig 3 - Spanning tree for Example 2
The numerical values in Example 2 arc
p, 0 .02 .4 0 0
0 .01 0 .3 .2
0 0 0 .4 .g
The lower bound on Ps from Eq. 25 is 0, but the
upper bound from Eq. 26 is
Ps S _ - .923
The values of the coefficients in Eq. 31 are
a - .4 b - .6 c8 - .09 cf - .06
Thus r-.06 and Ect. 32 yields
.561 - ,06[-.95-.00_.06 < Ps
The actual Pt and bounds are summarized in Table I.
TABLE 1 - State Probabilities and Bounds for
Example 2
States I 2 3 4 5
UB (Eq, 26) .048 ,923 .032 .222 .667
p_ .O42 .845 .028 .02g .057
LB "tree" .561
Approximations Based on Combinations of the Above
Methods
The bounds which are discussed in the preceding
section are useful in their own right, as well as
when combined with the merging and decomposition
processes. For example, suppose that intuition tells
us that several states are of low probability and can
be dropped to simplify a model. We can use the
upper bounds to guide us in identifying states which
can be eliminated by merging them into other model
states.
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Use of Bounds as a Guide for Merging Low
Probability States
Suppose it is desired to simplify a Markov process
by dropping states with a probability of .033 or less
These states will not really be eliminated, rather
they are to be merged with other states. In Example
2, the upper bounds from Eq. 26 and the exact state
probabilities are shown in Table 1. Only state 3 has
a probability <.033 and should he dropped, i.e.,
merged with state 2. Since the whole object is to
simplify computations, we do not yet know that state
4 could also be dropped. (The upper bound on state
4 is not sharp.) Simply increase Pss to keep
the second column sum unity, and drop row and
column
.02.97 .3P " .01 .3
0 .4
The exact stationary probabilities are now:.
.044 .869 .029 .058
which agree well with the exact terms in Table I.
Note that the new merged state probability is
appro_mately equal to the sum for states 2 and 4
.869 _ .845 + 028
The process of dropping states can be
generalized as follows. If the upper bound for Pk
indicates that state k is relatively unimportant, then
drop the k'th row and the k'th column from the
Markov probability matrix. This will require that
certain remaining values must be increased to
maintain the unit column sums.
In the following example we compare approximate
decomposition and hounds. A Markov process of
fourth order is given
E']['1:+ +!l ° °0 .06 Ps = Ps (33)
• I .02 P4 P4
The exact values of PL together with the upper
and lower bounds from Eq. (25) and Eq. (26) are
TABLE 2 - Bounds and State Probabilities for
Example of Eq. 33
UB (Eq. 26) .545 .712 .051 .100
exact pt .311 .592 .017 .080
LB (Eq. 25) . .262 .545 0 .022
The worst bound, as far as ratios go, is the lower
bound on Ps" However, the error of .017 actually
makes this the best bound in absolute error. This
example was chosen to be "approximately
decomposable" into components
[3 :i]
These have stationary state probabilities .9, .I, and
.333, .667. Multiplying these, we get
.3OO .600 .033 .O67
Cgnclusions
We conclude that the bounds which have been
developed along with the various approximation
techniques provide a valuable set of tools for solving
complex Markov models. In some cases, a closed
form analytical solution can be obtained. In other
cases, bounds are available. Lastly, if a computer
modeling program is required, our computations can
be used as a check and to provide insight. Recent
work on the solution of large Markov models which
are appr'cximately decomposable is described in
lazeolla 1984 and 1988, Courtois 1977 and Boxma
1986.
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ABSTRACT
Modeling the reliability of Local Area Networks (LAN) and LANS
interconnected by bridges and routers is a challenging problem because
of the network complexity. If repair is included, the problem becomes
even more complex and the general approach is to formulate a Markov
model. The difficulty is that the several components of a LAN and their
various modes of failure lead to a very complex Markov model with
hundreds or thousands of states.
A basic approach is to simplify the problem by reducing the number
of states by truncation and state merging.
The example used in this paper is a LAN described by Bateman and
Cortes [7] with a Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI), dual
(redundant) counter rotating rings and two wiring concentrators which
provide connections between the 16 computing, stations and the two
network rings. The primary ring carries communication until a failure
takes place and then the secondary ring is activated. The Markov model
which Bateman and Cortes formulated for this system required 189 states
and solution of this model took about I/2 minute of VAX cpu time.
This paper consider various simplification methods which have
recently been developed by Shopman and Laemmel [14, 15] and applies
them to this problem to illustrate their power in reducing the complexity
of otherwise nearly intractable communications network models.
Through the use of state merging, we were able to reduce the
Bateman-Cortes 161 state model to a two state model with a closed form
solution which yielded an up state complexity of Pup = 0.999097895
compared with 1_85) -, 0.9990973 which was computed in the Bateman
and Cortes paper. Other approximations are also discussed.
In the case of coupled networks, we must employ a technique which
allows for problem decomposition. We begin in a top down fashion and
assume that the network coupling elements (bridges) fail in a few simple
modes, initially just good or bad. We can then decouple (decompose) the
problem into a combination of bridge and LAN subsystems and formulate
a reliability block diagram or fault tree to represent the entire system.
INTRODUCTION
Modeling the reliability of Local Area Networks (LAN) and LANS
interconnected by bridges' and repeaters (see Note 1) is a challenging
problem because of the network complexity [I], [2]. Furthermore, as
users depend more heavily on LANs, many will regard reliability as the
paramount goal, [3], p. 165. Previous network approaches have dwelt on
the combinatorics of the problem [4], and much of the work has not
included equipment repair. In the case of no repair, combinatorial
cut-set and tie-set methods can be used [5].
If repair is included, the problem becomes more complex and one
'A repeater connects two LANS and passesall messages on LAN I to
LAN 2 and vice-versa. A bridge also connects two LANS but is smarter.
It knows who is connected to each LAN and ignores intralan messages
but passes on interlan messages in both directions. A bridge also has a
"learning mode" which allows it to automatically build a "membership"
table as the netv, ork is initially configured.
relies on the general approach to modeling repairable systems, i.e.
formulation of a Markov model [6], [5]. The difficulty with such an
approach is that the several components of a LAN (dual attachment
stations, single attachment stations*, wiring concentrators, station ports,
station links, bridges, and touters) and their various modes of failure lead
to very complex Markov models with hundreds or thousands of states
[7], [8]. Contemporary approaches to the solution of complex Markov
models involve the use of modern, efficient Markov model solvers.
Several such programs were developed to solve fault-tolerant computing
models, [9], [10], [11i, [12], during the 1950's with support from NASA
Langley Research Center.
Other approachs are to simplify the problem by reducing the number
of states through truncation (deleting low probability multiple failure
states), [131 and state merging [14], [15l. Of course, a configuration
involving more than one LAN with associated bridges and repeaters, (an
extended LAN), is even more complex and a combination of various
modeling strategies and approximations is necessary.
The logical structure of the bridges is quite complex, and the
algorithms which they implement in building network interconnections,
handling the routing of messages, recovery, etc. needs further study, [ 16],
[I 7]. These details can also be modeled using a Markov model, however,
the complexity of the problem increases with the number of bridge
failure modes.
This paper will consider various simplification methods which have
recently been developed [141, [151 and apply them to various LAN and
extended LAN model, to illustrate their power in reducing the
complexity of otherwise nearly intractable communications network
models. (Even if the models are tractable, the computation times are long
and the results are difficult to interpret because of the complexity of the
model.)
COMPLEXITY
The standard model for analyzing the reliability and availability of
a system with repair is a Markov model. If a Markov model has M states,
then the related equations are a set of M coupled first order differential
equations. If only steady state probabilities are required, the M
differential equations can be converted into M simultaneous linear
equations. For any sizable practical problem, such as the type of networks
we are considering, M becomes very large, solution times become very
long, and design insight and parameter sensitivity computations become
very difficult. If there are n elements in a system, the Markov model
may contain as many as 2" states, which results in a set of 2" coupled first
order differential equations. Even if steady state values are acceptable,
the resulting set of 2_ coupled linear equations is formidable.
Consider the following example. Bateman and Cortes [71 modeled a
Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) ring, with dual (redundant)
counterrotating rings and two wiring concentrators (which provide
connections between stations and rings), see Fig. I. The primary ring
carries communication until a failure takes place and then the secondary
2A station is an addressable device attached to the network such as a
computer, a terminal server, a workstation, etc.
0149-144X/91/0000-0129501.00 © 1991 IEEE
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counter rotating ring is activated.
Each of the two concentrators has $ stations (single attachment
stations, SAS) which can communicate with each other yielding 2 out of
16 = 120 different combinations of connections. One could formulate a
Markov model based upon the number of communication pairs which are
working in the system, yielding a 120 state model. Bateman andCortes
[7] focused on the number of stations which could communicate through
each concentrator and the states were labeled accordingly, e.g.• state 88
meant 8 stations on concentrator one could communicate with any of the
8 stations on concentrator two or with each other (inter as well as intra
concentrator communication), and state 87 meant that one station on
concentrator two could not communicate. Their model is shown in part
in Fig. 2, and the total number of states is delineated in Table I. Note
that there are 8 ! total states shown in Table I. The 20 states shown above
the dashed line in Table i are represented in Fig. 2. Note that states 75
and 57 are lumped together since the two permutations are assumed to be
equivalent in a reliability sense, and the 16 such states are marked with
• in Table I. The remaining 45 states represent states where half (8) or
fewer of the stations are connected, and all these are merged into State
SS in Fig. 2. Since 8 or more disconnected stations represent major
degredation, State SS is considered to be a failure state.
Each of the twenty states represented by circles in the Fig. 2 has
additional associated failure modes which we can visualize as additional
Markov model states appearing beneath the paper along an axis
perpendicular to the plane of the paper. If the various failure modes are
considered, each state in Fig. 2. has 7 additional associated states, [8], and
we have 20 x 8 - 160 states, plus state SS, which yields 161 states.
Solution of this model took about I/2 minute of VAX :pu time using the
SHARPE program, [18].
Another more complex example involves an FDD[ ring used as a
backbone 3 m connect four other LANS (two Ethernets, one Token ring,
and a Token bus), via a packet forwarding device such as a gateway" or
bridge and 3 computers. See Fig. 3.
In the system of Fig. 3 there are 22 different stations, including the
computers shown and a 4 gateway/bridge connector, yielding a total of
26 elements (assuming that link reliability is ignored because it is much
higher than station reliability). If we use a brute force Markov modeling
approach we have 2 m ,, 64 million states! Clearly• we need to apply some
modeling expertise if we are to solve this problem, and two general
approaches will be discussed in the following section to guide one in
model simplification.
APPROACHES TO MODELING AND COMPLEXITY REDUCTION
Bottom-Up Approach
One approach to modeling a complex problem is to identify all the
elements and all the possible failure modes and visualize the complete
state space of the problem. One can then formulate a reduced model
The basic approaches to model reduction are:
1. State merging
2. Probability bounds
3. State truncation
4. Problem decomposition
State Merging
State merging refers to the combining of states (also called
aggregation), generally to simplify a problem. For example in the model
given in Fig. 2, the authors merged state $7 with state 75. This was based
on arguments of system symmetry and reasoning that communication
between 5 stations on concentrator I with 7 stations on concentrator 2 is
no different than communication between 7 stations on concentrator I
with $ stations on concentrator 2. in this example, this is true, however,
there are general theorems which can be used to prove the validity of
such mergers in general, [14]. In fact, such theorems can be applied to
further simplify the model of Fig. 2.
A more complete version of the Markov model given in Fig. 2 in the
vicinity of state 88 is given in Fig. 4. In the event of a station, station
port, or station link failure, a failure state (wrapped, bypassed, or
3A backbone is the major structure to which other subsidiary
networks and devices connect.
'A gateway forwards packets at a higher level than a bridge and is
often used to connect wide area networks, WAN;S.
partitioned) is entered. A failure in a station, station port or station link
will result in a bypassed station, i.e., the model will move from state 88
to state 87. There are two types of ports in the wiring concentrator.
station ports and ring ports [8]. A station port connects to an end station.
A ring port is connected to the backbone ring and interconnects the two
wiring concentrators. A wrapped network (state 88W) will only occur
when there is a failure in the backbone ring or in one of the ring ports.
A second ring port failure will result in a "partitioned" network (state 88
P). Multiple station, station port or station link failures will result only
in "bypassed" states like state 87, 86, 77, and so forth (Fig. 2).
In Fig. 4, state 88 represents complete operation of the system and all
other states represent degraded operation or complete failure. An am
illustration of the power of the state merging method, we will reduce the
model represented by Figs. 2 and 4 to an equivalent two state model
composed of two blocks of merged states. The first block will consist of
only state 88 and will be called Bup and the second block will contain all
the other states in the model and will be called Bdown, see Fig. $. In Fig.
4 we illustrate these two blocks by the interior and exterior of the shaded
circle. The mathematical conditions under which various types of
merging can take place are developed in [14] and are given in Appendix
A. For this type of merger, all the transition rates from the states within
Bdown to Bup must be the same. The repair rates indicated in Figs. 2,
and 4 are given in Table 3.
For the merger conditions to hold exactly, I_, - I=, - I=, - t=,, and the
Bateman and Cortes paper assumes that IX, _,, and I_o" IS, however, _ ,,
0 (no repair shown) and the condition is violated. Since the probability
of "all the other states" as defined in Table 3 is small, ]7], their effect will
be small, and the violation of the condition will be insignificant. Thus,
we proceed as if the conditions were all met, and set all repair rates to In.
The merger results in the two state model of Fig.$.
The equivalent repair rate y in Fig. $ is set - I_, which in the paper
[7] was assumed to be 0.25 repairs/hr, which is the reciprocal of the
assumed mean time to repair, MTTR - 4 hours. The mathematical
conditions for the merger also require that the equivalent failure rate, x,
be set equal to the sum of all the transition rates from Bup to Bdown,
which are given in Table 3. Thus, x = 225.726 x 10".
For the two state model of Fig. 5, it is a well known result that.the
steady state value of the probability of being in the up state is given by
P(Bup) - P(8g) - y/(y + x) - 0.25/(0.25 + 225.73 x 104 ) (I)
= 0.999097879
From the paper, [7], the value calculated using the SHARPE program was
P(gg) = 0.9990973, and the two state approximation yields very accurate
results since the percentage difference in [I - P(gg)] is .066%
Prohahtlitr Bounds
One can establish various upper and lower bounds and
approximations on Markov model state probabilities by simple
computations involving the terms in the probability transition matri:c
[19|, [15]. For example, a simple upper bound on a Markov steady state
probability is given by:
R s g/(l - P(i,i) + _) (2)
where: p,
M,
P(i,i)
= the steady state probability for the i'th model state
- the maximum off diagonal transition
= the diagonal element for row i of the transition matrix
As an example of how these bounds are applied we consider the Markov
model of Fig. 2. First we will use Eq. (2) to calculate an upper bound for
state 88. The top row in the transition matrix shown in Table 4 contains
a diagonal term as the first term which is equal to unity minus the sum
of all the transitions leaving the state which was previously computed in
Table 3, thus
P(i,i) - 225.73 x 10 "= (3)
For state 88, (the top row in the transition matrix)• the terms following
the diagonal term are zero except for the repair transitions from various
states back to state 88, which are all the same and equal to 0.25, th,ls the
maximum off diagonal term is 0.25 and
- o.2s (4)
-2-
Substitution of Eq. (3) and (4) into Eq. (2) yields the result p88 =
0.999097895, thus our previous approximation is also an upper bound.
It is useful to use the interpretations of the previous computation to
rewrite Ecl. (2) in a form which can yield insight when the Marker model
is studied. The nondiagonal terms in the zran#ition matrix are the
transition rate on the branches entering a node in the associated Marker
graph. Thus, if we wish to calculate an upper bound on p,, then M_is the
maximum transition rate associated with all the branches which enter
node i. The diagonal term in each row of the transition matiix is given
by I -E leaving branch rates. Thus, l-P, - I_ leaving branch rates, and Ecl.
(2) becomes
p_ s Maximum Entering Branch Rate (5)
I: Leaving Branch Rates + Max. Entering Branch Rate
State Truncation
Practitioners have used state truncation as a technique for solving
complex Markup models for many years. In general the analyst identifies
states in the initial Markup diagram which seem to be of low probability
based on intuition or some rough computation, and these are deleted from
the model. This process continues until a manageable size model is
obtained which is then solved. The problem with this practical approach
is that one can never be sure about the size of the error produced by
neglecting the truncated states. The availability of the simple bounds of
the previous section supplies a general technique for computing the
significance of the t,unceted states. For example, [7] reduced the 21 state
Markup model shown in FiB. 2 to a simplified 6 state model (see Fig. 6).
This problem provides a good example for application of the state
probability bounds. The simplified model in Fig. 6 will hold if we can
show that states 85, 75, 65, and 55 have negligible small probabilities.
Our approach is to apply Eq. (5) to each of these states and show that the
upper bound probabilities are all negligibly and thus can be deleted.
Bateman and Cortes [7] showed this was so by solving the complete model
first. Unfortunately, when we apply Eq. (5) to compute the upper
bounds, they all turn out to be 0.5 which are not sharp enough bounds to
provide the desired proof. The reason why this happens can be easily
understood if we consider Eq. ($), and Table 4. The maximum
off-diagonal terms in rows g$, 75, 65, and 55 are the repair rates It,
which numerically dominates the sum, thus the ratio given by Eq.(5) is
approximately I_,/(It,+l&,)- I/2.
Another technique for obtaining the solution is to use a more
advanced set of bounds given in |19|. Also a third approach is to merge
states 88, 87, 86, 77, 76, and 66 into block BI and the remainder of the
states into block B2. If we can show that the probability for block B2 is
negligible then all the states in B2 can be neglected.
Problem Decompostz:on
In some situations it is possible to decompose (disaggregate) a Marker
model into two simpler models, where the original model reliabi'?des are
simply related to those of the decomposed parts, since it is easier to solve
the parts and combine the results than to solve the original model, this
represents a simplification [14].
A Top-Down Approach
Another approach to reliability modeling of complex interconnected
communication networks is to view the interconnected networks as a
system of independent elements and each LAN, gateway/bridge, or
computer as a subsystem. A reliability/availability fault-tree or block
diagrma can then be used to decompose the system reliability/availability
into subsystem reliabilitiez/availabilities. Of course we must formulate
and solve separate Markup modeht for each of the subsystems and then
substitute these probabilities into the combinatorial expressions for the
fault-tree or block diagram, however, this "divide and conquer" approach
is easier. The top down approach which we have just described is similar
mathematically to the decomposition approach of the preceding section,
however, the motivation is based upon system considerations rather than
mathematical properties of the problem.
As an example of situations where the repair organization can lead to
coupling and decoupling, let us consider two hypothetical distributed
networks, one where the top-down approach will work, and one where
it will fail. Assume we have an organization with a distributed network
similar to Fig. 3. Suppose the backbone LAN and each of the 4
connected LAN's are run by different groups often in different buildings
which perform their own repair and maintenance, le.g. a university with
Ethernec
(on right)
Ethernet:
(on bottom)
Token Ring:
largely independent departments and research laboratories). Such a
situation does not have repairman coupling and should fit the necessary
assumptions for top-down decomposition. However, suppose the Model
of Fig. 3 is I_,r a large insurance company where each network represents
a division of the company located on one or more different floors of a
large office building. In such a case, it is likely that a central
organization will administer and service all the networks, and the repair
actions of this group will couple all the systems. Thus, the networks
would not be independent, and top-down decomposition might not be
appropriate.
We can further illustrate the method using the example of Fig. 3.
We will use the following notation for the elements of the distributed
network shown in Fig. 3, which is referred to as the system, SY:
FDDI Ring: N_ with computers C,, Ca, C_ (labeled clockwise
(BACKBONE) starting at the top).
Token Bus: N 2 with stations St1, S_, Sa, S_ (labeled from left to
right).
N3 with stations S_,, S_z, _ S_ (labeled from left to
right)
N, with stations S,1, S,z. S,_, S,,, S,,s
Ns with stations S_,, Sap S._, S..,. S._ Sm (labeled clockwise
from 12 o'clock position) ,
Gateways: G, from N1 to N,, Gz from N, to N3, G3 from N_ to N,,
and G, from N, to N s
If we assume that there is no repairman coupling between networks, (i.e.
each network has its own repairman), and that the gateways G,-G_ are
considered part of N1, then we can write the following expression for the
system reliability assuming that success means that all stations can
communicate with each other.
R(SY) - P(N,. Na. N3. N,. N_) (6)
where N. = the event-all items in network i are working.
if the networks are independent, as we are assuming, then Eq. (I)
becomes:
P(SY) - P(N,) ,(P(N2) ,(P(N_) x P(N,) ,_P(Ns) (7)
Each of the probabilities PfN,), are obtained from a separate Markup
model as described below.
Model for Na, N_, N,
Model for Ns
Model for N,
Includes 4 or 5 stations plus ethernet attachments
and network control units.
Includes 6 stations plus token ring attachment and
network control units.
Includes 3 computers, 4 gateways, and FDDI
attachment and network control units.
Each of the 5 Markup models is solved for the network success
probabilities and these are substituted into Eq. (2). Although 5 separate
Markup models are involved, the computations are still much simpler
than solving a single 26 element model.
If a single repairman services all the networks there is coupling, and
the above decomposition does not hold exactly. However, suppose that
we compute the probability that a service queue is greater than one (the
coupling condition). If this probability is sufficiently small, then
decoupling is still a good approximation.
The probability that a station, say station S._, can communicate with
another station, say station S_, can be accomplished by a method very
similar to the calculation of P(SY) in Eqs. (6) and (7). In order for S_ to
communicate with S,z, everything in the path from Su to S,a has to be
available. This can be visualized by drawing a Reliability Block Diagram
(RBD), as shown in Fig. 7.
If all the blocks in the diagram are up and available, then there can
be communication between the two terminals.
If we assume independence within the subsystems:
A - At,, x Ae, ' x A_, x A_,_ _ A,a (g)
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here
A
A_,
= Probability that Sa can communicate with S,_ (availability)
= Probability that Sa, (S,_) is up
= Probability that bridge (gateway) I (2) is up
= Probability that the backbone ring is up
A Markov model can be developed for each one of the subsystems to find
their "UP" probabilities.
This example results in a simple series RBD, however, if there had
been two different bridges (bsl and bsl') attaching N3 to the backbone
(a very common occurrence), they would have been represented in the
RBD by two blocks in parallel. This would result in the RBD of Fig. 8,
and the availability would be given by:
A ° A=I _ (I -(I-Am, ) (l-Ak,.)) x A_, _<Ae,2 x A_ (9)
Notice that a model for each pair of users could potent;'lly result in
a different RBD. However, most of the time one model will be
representative of a group of stations, so that only a few different RBD's
would need to be developed.
The analysis just performed will provide us with a "user perceived"
availability of the network. If user S._ can communicate with S,_, then
user S_ cooside.s the network up, regardless of what is happening with
the rest of the network. The analysis for P(SY) as described in the paper,
on the other hand, will provide us with a "network view" of availability
(or reliability). If a model is created to aid in network product design
decisions, a network view of availability is sufficient. However, if we
decide that a user view is most important, the problem could be much
larger, as seen in the above example. Another interesting, but difficult
problem, is that of determining the probability that say 90% of the
stations can communicate.
NEW RESEARCH AND APPROACHES
The development of a Markov model for a big, complex network will
always result in a big, intractable and unmanageable state space. The two
approaches available to deal with this problem are to either tolerate the
largeness ('largeness tolerance'), or avoid it ('largeness avoidance') [20].
In this paper both approaches have been studied.
The bottom up approach, is an example of the "largeness tolerance"
approach. A complete model for the network has to be formulated,
followed by the applications of the appropriate reduction techniques.
The approach has the advantage of providing relatively accurate results,
and once the model reduction has been accomplished, analysis will
require very short computation times [7]. However, the model for the
complete network has to be developed first. In a big and complex
network, generation of the Markov model could be very difficult, if not
impossible. Automatic generation of the state space may solve this
problem. The use of Stochastic Petri Nets is an effective tool that can be
used to model the system [21]. Once the network has been described with
a Petri Net, several packages exist to generate and analyze it's associated
Markov chain [22]. For very complex models, however, hugh files will
be generated, vast amounts of memory will be required, and the analysis
could take many hours of CPU time to complete.
The combinatorial methods, shown in Section 3.2 as a top down
approach,are examples of the "largeness avoidance" approach. The
technique will not require the.development of a large, intractable models
of the complete network. There are, however, several problems that still
need to be solved. The accuracy of the model, for example, is greatly
dependent on the assumption of independent repair facilities for each one
of the different subsystems. More research is needed if the method is to
be applied to cases where this assumption is not valid. A possible
trade-off could be a mixed approach, where the bottom up approach can
be used for portions of the network where the assumption cannot be
made, together with a top down approach linking all the portions where
the assumption can be safely made.
Two more factors should be considered when modeling systems like
those discussed in this paper.
Intermittents: Intermittent failures are those that clear themselves or
only require a reboot of the system without repair being involved. It
has been shown that intermittent failures can account for more than
90% of all the failures experienced by a system. The introduction of
intermittents will make the model and analysis of the problem much
more complex.
* Performance: Extremely low performance (either low throughput or
high delay, or both) can be regarded, from a user perspective, as an
unavailable or marginally available system. A decision should be
made regarding what is considered a "down" system. The model, for
example, could be extended to assume that the system is down if the
delay is above a certain threshold or the throughput is below a certain
threshold.
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APPENDIX A - State Merler Conditions
The rules for state merger are given in Table A- I below. (See [5], pp.
529-533.)
As an example of the application of these rules consider the 8 state
Markov model given in Fig. A-I.
We wish to simplify by merging states 0[ l, 10l, l l0 into block B[ and
states 001,010. 100 into block B2. The results appear in Fig. A-2.
The result of the merging has been to reduce an g state model to an
equivalent and much simpler 4 state model.
_.1,2
Notation:
P'2 P(.YtY2Ys)" St0t "10l' etc.
a. Resultsof applying rule 2
/z
(_,I"FX2+_,3)=3_,
b. Results of a,oplying rules 2 and 3
JJ. 2/J. 3p.
c. Results of applying rules 2. 3. 4
Fig. A-2 A Model Obtained from Fig. A-I by Merging States
TABLE A- I - State Merger Conditions
STATE MERGER CONDITIONS
The Followina are a Necessary and Sufficient Set
of Conditions for Merain= States in a Markov Model
4.
5.
Transition rates between two nonmerged states are unchanged.
Transitions from a block of merged states to an unmerged state must
all have the same transition rate. Note: If the original model has no
tran:ition branch from one of the merged states in the block to the
unmerged state, then the transmission probability for the missing
branch must be treated as zero.
Transitions from an unmerged state to a block of merged states are
replaced by a single transition with a rate equal to the sum of the
transition rates in the original model.
Transitions between any block of merged states BI and any other
block of merged states B2 must satisfy the following two rules:
a. The transition rates from each node in block BI to all nodes in
block B2 must sum to the same ooztttent C,,=.
b. The transition ratesfrom each node in block B2 toallnodes in
block BI must sum to the same constant Ca,.
Transition rates to the same block (self loops) are determined by
summing the rates for all branches leaving the block and setting this
sum to unity. The self loop turns out to be unity minus the sum of the
transition rates of branches leaving the block.
Fig. a,-I An g State Markov Model for Three Distinct Elements
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TABLE I States for the Model of Fig. 2
8g g7 86 85 84 g3 82 81 80
7g" "/7 76 75 74 73 72 71 70
68' 67' 66 65 64 63 62 61 60
58' 57' 56' 55 54 53 52 51 50
48' 47' 46' 45' 4-; 43 42 41 40
38' 37' 36' 35 34 33 32 3[ 30
2g' 27' 26 25 24 23 22 21 20
18' ]7 16 15 14 13 12 II 10
08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 O0
TABLE 2 Transition Rates from Block Bdown to Bup
Initial State Final State Transition Rate
(Repair)
&? 88 p,
00 88 #,
gBW 88 _p
SS 88 _,
All Other 88 Px = 0
States
TABLE 3 Transition Rates from Block Bup to Bdown
[nitia[ State Final State Transition Rate Numerical
(Repair) value x 10 "s
gg
88
88
88
g8
87 16_n+16Acp 191.104
00 16_nu+20_pu+2,_u 13.406
8gw 4_cp 9.044
80 2_c 12.172
All Other 0 0
States
Total
Note: Bateman and Cortes [7] assume that knu = 0.680, kcu = 0.603,
kpu = 0.066, kc = 6.086, _cp ,, 2.261. All failure rates are given as
failures per million hours.
TaOle 4 A Transition Matrtx for the Markov Model of Fig. 2
88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81
88 I -}.m _, 0 0 0 0 0 0
87 16t, I -;L._ I_ 0 0 0 0 0
0 7,1., I-X m _ 0 0 0 0
0 0 6,1. I -k= p_. 0 0 0
86
85
84
83
82
81
i- 77
<
I- 76
75
I-
Z 74
uj
73
72
66
65
64
63
55
54
O0
0 0 5_. i l-kb. _ 0 0 0
0 0 0 4_. I-k, p., 0 0
0 0 0 0 3,[.. I - kmz p. 0
0 0 0 0 0 _, )l-lm, 0
8_. 0 0 0 0 0
• 0 8,1, 0 0 0
0 0 8,1., 0 0
0 0 0 8_, 0
0 0 0
0 0 ' 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0
0
0 0
0 8,[. 0 0
0 0 &l. 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
NEW STATE
77 76 75 74 I 73 72 66 65 64 63 55 54 O0
0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p_
_. 0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0 I-k_
0
0
0 0 0
0 0 0
;_ 0 0
0 _ 0
0 0 it.
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 I-k,m _ 0 0
0 0 l-k,s : _ 0
0 0 0 I -_.,, I_
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 .0 0
0 _ 0 0 O 0
0 0 I_ 0 0 0
0 0 0 _ 0 0
0 0 0 _ 0
0 I -_'n 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 I - ;tmm _ 0 0 0
0 0 12J, 1 -_ _, 0 0
0 0 0 ._., I-X_ I_ 0
,I-%= 07_, 0 0 0 'g-, :
0
0
0
0 0
0 0
0 7_,
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0 i-Zn I_,
0 0
0 0
0 ?_, 0
0 0 71.
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
O 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
p_ 0
0 0
0 0 6k, 0 0 I-X_ I_ 0
0 0 0 6_, 0 _03¢ I -J._ O
a 0 0 0 a 0 a I - X.=
7. here _. + Lp = _.,
k., = _ transition rates le_,._ng sl3te ;j
a = 9k._2k_
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_/l_ng Port
/ CONCENTRATOR _
Station
Port
Fig. I FDD[ Ring Network with Dual Counter Rotating Rings and
Two Wiring Concentrators [7]
"
Fig. 3 A System Composed of 5 Coupled LANS. (Tutorial example
adapted from Fig. 3-26, [23]
Note, this figure contains the four, most popular types of local area
networks which all differ in geometry (ring or [inear/bus).
transmission media (fiberoptics, coaxial cable, twisted copper wires),
and network control methods (message broadcast or control token
passing), the acronym FDDI stands for fiber distributed data
interface which is often used as a backbone to connect other
networks (as illustrated in the figure) because of its high
transmission speed. (See [23].)
Is_4m + t')_*ra + 2A[,1h '
t_?l. +,be
I_p_ + 3_f_ GA
Fig. 4 Detailed Markov Model of FDD! Network (see Fig. 2) in the
Vicinity of State 88 [7]
Bup = P88 Bdown - All other states
Fig.5 SimplifiedTwo Block Markov Model for Figs.2, 4.
$_p_ $_p_
$ _ P__
r_
(
8._ .t,, [
SAp,.
r_c
+
6/_P i
._.t.: 4- SAp, _t,t,: 4" 4Ap.
$_pc $_P':I
_$ T& '
|A,t,:
|_pc
tt_t
O,_,c + OAp,_ + 2X/
9)-s,, 4" _Ap¢ 4.2_ I
STAr I
SS
_rig Markov Model of FDDi Dual Ring, Two Concentrator Network [7]
- 7- OF POOR QUALITY
Fig. 6
6_. + 16_,,_
+
8_,;p
A Simplified 6 State Model Approximating the Model of
Fig. 2.
Fig. 7. A RBD for Communication Between $34 and $42
[_r_r Bridge }
Fig. 8 A RBD for Communication Between $34 and $42 for a
Two-Bridge Connection Between LAN N3 and the Backbone
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